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Public Policy, Entrepreneurship and the U.S. 
Job Creation Experience 
The Corporation for Enterprise Development 
The United States has adjusted to the post 1973 era of structural 
economic change with far greater employment growth than any 
comparable European nation, several of which actually lost jobs. 
For this reason, policymakers in Europe are looking to the U.S. 
experience for signals on how they might intervene to improve 
their own employment situation. Policy prescriptions range from 
exclusive attention to rigidities affecting the supply of labor 
to policies to remedy the problem through conventional macro-
economic policies. 
In this paper, we examine the U.S. job creation experience from 
1970-1984 in the hope of illuminating at least some of the policy 
prescriptions that do and do not appear to explain the U.S.'s 
relative good fortune over this period. The paper is divided 
into three parts: 
Part I reviews comparative data on the U.S. and European ex-
perience and attempts to develop measures of relative performance 
that get beyond the usual comparisons of absolute job growth. 
Sectoral changes in the composition of employment growth are also 
covered, as is the puzzle of "jobless growth" in Europe. 
While labor market rigidities in Europe may or may not contribute 
to problems there, we argue that the sources of overall U.S. 
flexibility are much broader, and hence cannot be explained well 
by labor markets per se. 
Part II then takes a look at various explanations put forward of 
how public policy in the U.S. has contributed to our job growth, 
and attempts to separate the wheat from the chaff. Explanations 
covered are taxation, deregulation, federal expenditures (inclu-
ding defense, health care, human capital, and the overall effect 
of macro-economic policy) and support for entrepreneurship at the 
federal, state and local levels. 
Part III then develops the assertion that the U.S. experience is 
better explained by a high level of dynamism and innovation in 
the U.S. economy, and pinpoints the presence of a strong "entre-
preneurial sector" as a primary source of this dynamism. A stage 
by stage categorization of environmental supports to entrepre-
neurship is then presented to clarify the elements the U.S. 
already has in place which nurture this entrepreneurial sector. 
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I. Job Creation in the O.S. and Europe: A Review of the 
Numbers 
There is no question but that the U.S. outperformed Europe in 
creating jobs for its people from 1970-1984. Even so, the 
numbers commonly tossed around to highlight this disparity are 
somewhat misleading. In the first two parts of this section, 
such numbers are replaced with measures that more accurately 
reflect the relative job performance of nations during this 
period. Later in the Section, we review some of the explanations 
commonly given for this disparity between North American job 
growth versus, in several cases, aggregate job loss in Europe. 
1.1 Some Apples and Oranges 
From 1970 to 1984, the U.S. created over 26 million jobs. By 
comparison, the four largest European nations — with a combined 
1970 labor market slightly larger than ours -- lost over half a 
million jobs. Japan, which did reasonably well, with 6.7 million 
new jobs, nonetheless also fell far short of the U.S. figure, 
even when viewed in terms of percentage job growth. Japan 
generated job growth of 13-4 percent; the U.S., 33-5 percent. 
(See table 1.1.) 
1.2 Comparing Apples with Apples 
What is wrong with these oft quoted numbers? A look at table 1.2 
should make it clear: the U.S. labor force grew by 37.2 percent 
over the relevant period, while Japan's grew by only 15.3 
percent. What this means is that if every new entrant in Japan's 
labor force immediately found a job, Japan would still have 
experienced only 15.5 percent job growth, well below the U.S. 
figure, yet as well as any country could hope for. Job growth or 
percentage job growth needs to be considered in the context of 
labor fc/ve growth. Labor force growth implies growth in demand 
as well as supply of labor, and both shifts should lead to 
greater employment.1 
It is for this reason a little misleading to call employment 
growth figures measures of "job creation," as if jobs were 
created independent of labor supply. They are a measure of job 
creation, yet a more precise relationship tõ Tabor force growth 
would be more helpful. 
In a perfectly functioning market, virtually any increase in the 
labor supply will be employed, although at lower wages. 
Therefore, differing levels of labor force growth should not 
explain changing unemployment patterns among nations, except as 
measures of how closely their Labor market performs relative to 
the textbook model. Thi' measure we introduce in table 3 
attempts to compare nations' performance on this basis. 
2a 
Table Ι.χ 
Changes in Civilian Employment in Selected Countries 
1970-1984 
(All numbers adjusted to approximate U.S. concepts. 
All numbers in thousands.) 
United States 
Japan 
Four Largest European 
Countries, Total 
Germany 
Great Britain 
France 
Italy 
1970 
78,678 
50,140 
89,250 
26,100 
23,780 
20,290 
19,080 
1984 
105,005 
56,870 
88,640» 
24,610» 
22,960» 
20,670* 
20,400» 
Change 
+26,327 
+6,730 
-610 
-1,490 
-820 
+380 
+1,320 
% Change 
+33.5 + 13.4 
-0.7 
-5.7 -3-4 
+ 1.9 
+6.9 
Table 1.2 
Changes in Size of Civilian Labor Force in Selected Countries 
1970-1984 
United States 
Japan 
Four Largest European 
Countries, Total 
Germany 
Great Britain 
France 
Italy 
* Preliminary 
1970 
82,771 
50,730 
91 ,200 
26,240 
24,510 
20,800 
19,650 
1984 
113,544 
58,480 
97,680* 
26,700* 
26,390* 
22,990* 
21,600* 
Change 
30,773 
7,750 
6,480 
460 
1 ,880 
2,190 
1,950 
% Change 
37.2 
15.3 
7.1 1.8 
7.7 
10.5 
9.9 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Statistical Supplement 
to International Comparisons of Unemployment, Bulletin 
1979, May 1985. (See our Appendix for reproduction of 
relevant tables.) 
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Table 1.3 provides one such measure. In the first three columns 
we see how absolute changes in the size of the labor force and 
the employment level combine to determine the rise or fall of 
absolute unemployment. In the final column, however, we see how 
well each economy was able to absorb a given increase in the size 
of its labor force. (The number tells us what percentage of new 
entrants were not accommodated with jobs. One hundred minus that 
number tells us what percentage were able to find work.)^ 
This number allows us to compare each nation's performance by a 
common scale. Glancing down this column, we see that Europe did 
in fact fare much worse than the U.S., but that Japan performed 
slightly better than the U.S. 
Table 1.4 presents similar data for ten countries, along with 
"before" and "after" rates of unemployment. In order to get a 
fuller sense of how well each nation did under different levels 
of strain, a comparison of all these numbers is recommended. 
For example, a country with a much larger labor force (assuming a 
healthy economy) can probably adjust more easily to changes in 
world markets, if only because of the greater diversification it 
presumably starts with. 
The initial rate of unemployment is crucial also, both as an 
indication of how tight or loose the labor market was at the 
beginning of the measured period, and as another check on how 
well the labor force 13 actually being served. For example, 
Sweden and Japan, which, along with the U.S., achieved the lowest 
rankings on the "% of new labor force entrants unable to find 
work" indicator, continue to boast unemployment rates only forty 
percent of that in the U.S.3 
2 One problem with this numbering is that measures of a nation's 
labor force generally fail to capture those persons who have 
eventually given up in their search for employment -- the 
"discouraged worker." On the other hand, use of the 
"employment-population ratio" fails to distinguish between 
economic performance and the growth of labor force participation 
by women. In the U.S., the importance of the latter phenomenon 
easily overshadows the discouraged worker measurement problem. 
In other countries, however, the opposite is probably true. For 
comparative data on the labor force participation of men versus 
women over time, see table 12 in our appendix. For 
employment-population ratio comparisons, see appendix table 13-
For discussion of the magnitude of the discouraged worker problem 
and other reasons why European unemployment measures may be 
greatly understated, see Guy Standing, Labour Surplus and Labour 
Flexibility: A European Perspective, International Labour 
Organization , 1986 . 
3 The caveats that must be mentioned concerning comparisons of such 
data are worthy of a separate paper themselves. It is not fair, 
in one sense, to compare unemployment rates in Sweden, Japan and 
the U.S. Yet from a policy perspective, comparisons are valid in 
so far as they measure citizens' experience. Thus while Sweden 
keeps the unemployed off the rolls with training and other 
activities, their experience is certainly different from a newly 
laid-off worker here. (All these numbers are at least adjusted 
to reflect U.S. concepts.) Other comparison problems relate to 
migrant labor, size of the underground economy, cyclical aberra-
tions in either endpoint year, and so on. 
3a 
Table 1.3 
Changes in Unemployment As Difference Between Growth of Labor 
Force and Growth of Jobs in Selected Countries 
1970-1984 
(All numbers adjusted to approximate U.S. concepts. 
All numbers in thousands.) 
Growth -
of 
Labor 
Forcei 
■ Growth = 
of 
Jobs 1 
Growth 
of 
Labor ? 
w/o Jobs 
As $ of 
Growth 
in 
Labor 
Force 
United States 30,773 
Japan 7,750 
Four Largest European 
Countries, Total 6,480 
Germany . 460 
Great Britain 1,880 
France 2,190 
Italy 1,950 
■26,327 
+6,730 
4,446 
1 ,020 
14.4 
13.2 
-610 
-1,490 
-820 
+ 380 
+1,320 
7,100 
1,950 
2,700 
1,810 
640 
109.6 
423.9 
143-6 
82.6 
32.8 
1 Taken from the previous two tables above 
Calculated directly from unemployment figures for 1970 and 
1984, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Statistical Supplement 
to International Comparisons of Unemployment, Bulletin 1979, 
May 1985. European numbers are preliminary. (See our 
Appendix for reproduction of relevant table.) 
3b 
Table 1.4 Growth of Civilian Labor Force, Employment and Unemployment in Ten Countries 
1970-1984 
(All numbers adjusted to approximate U.S. concepts. All numbers in thousands.) 
United States 
Japan 
Germany* 
Great Britain* 
France* 
Italy* 
Canada 
Australia 
Netherlands** 
Sweden 
Size of 
Labor Force 
in 1970 
82,771 
50,730 
26,240 
24,510 
20,800 
19,650 
8,395 
5,478 
4,710 
3,909 
% 
Growth 
of Lf 
1970-84 
37.2 
15.3 
1.8 
7.7 
10.5 
9.9 
47.7 
30.2 
21 .9 
12.2 
% 
Growth 
of Empi . 
1970-84 
33-5 
13.4 
-5.7 
-3-4 
1.9 
6.9 
38.9 
20.5 
7.0 
10.4 
% of 
Lf Growth 
Unable to 
find work 
14.4 
13.2 
423.9 
143.6 
82.6 
32.8 
23.1 
33.1 
69.9 
16.2 
Civ. 
Rate 
1970 
4.9 
1 .2 
0.5 
3.0 
2.5 
2.8 
5.7 
1.6 
3-2 
1.5 
Unem. 
in 
Civ . 
Unemp. 
in 1984 
7.5 
2.8 
7.8 
13.0 
10.1 
5.6 
11.3 
9.0 
15.0 
3.1 
* Data for 1984 is preliminary 
** Data for the Netherlands is for 1973-1984, and is preliminary for 1984. 
Source: Taken or calculated from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Statistical Supplement 
to International Comparisons of Unemployment, Bulletin 1979, May 1985. (See our Appendix 
for reproduction of relevant tables.) 
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1.3 Variations in Sectoral Job Growth 
Moving on to table 1.5, we gain a sectoral perspective on where 
job growth occurred (or did not occur). The very first column is 
a more useful variation on "% growth of labor force," in that it 
measures exactly what percentage growth of jobs would be required 
to employ all new entrants to the workforce. Then, within each 
major section (Agriculture, Industry^ and Services) the left 
columns indicate how important an employer that sector was in 
1970; the middle columns indicate percentage job growth through 
1982; and the right columns indicate that sector's contribution 
to total job growth. Adding the right hand columns for each 
sector we approximate the final column, total job growth 
achieved. 
Contrasting North America to Europe, we see that most European 
countries had not only to accommodate growth of their labor 
force, but also large numbers of workers dislocated from the 
shrinking agricultural and industrial sectors. The U.S. and 
Canada, on the other hand, experienced slight aggregate growth in 
industry, and little significant change in agriculture. Both 
countries faced extraordinary labor force growth, however; thus, 
while both found employment for an admirable percentage of this 
large growth of job seekers, Canada experienced an unemployment 
rate increase from 5.7 to 11.3; while the U.S. figure rose from 
4.9 to 7.5. (Refer back to table 1.4.) 
1 .4 The Dilemma of "Jobless Growth" 
Finally, table 1.6 points up a curious dilemma for Europe. 
Despite superior growth (relative to the U.S.) in manufacturing 
output and productivity, and comparable growth in total gross 
domestic product, most European countries experienced much 
greater declines in manufacturing employment over both 1960­1973 
and 1973—1983. This "jobless growth" has led some observers to 
conclude that Europe requires much larger output growth to 
achieve employment growth of any kind, and certainly less than is 
true in the U.S. (The Business Roundtable, "Job Creation: The 
United States and European Experience, December 12, 1984.) 
1 .5 What Does It All Mean? 
The data in the previous charts give us some numbers, or clues, 
but what is actually occurring in these economies? Some things 
are obvious, and others hotly debated. We know, for example, 
that the U.S. and Canada's huge labor force growth is due largely 
to increased work participation by women and the bulge of the 
post­war baby boom. We know that in Europe there is a lag in the 
baby boom and far less dramatic change in female workforce 
Data is also available in the Appendix for Manufacturing employ­
ment as a subset of■"Industry." In general, all nations fared 
worse in manufacturing than in industry as a whole. 
4a 
Table 1.5: Sectoral Contributions to Total Civilian Job Growth in Selected Countries, 1970-1982 
United States 
Japan 
Germany 4 
Great Britain 4 
France 4 
Italy 
Canada 
Sweden 
% Total 
Job 
Growth , 
Requlred-1-
31.9 
15.5 
1.5 
5.8 
10.3 
9.1 
1*5.0 
| 11.5 
% > 
Share 
of Jobs 
in 1970 
1.5 
16.9 
8.6 
3-2 
13-9 
20.1 
7.6 
8.2 
Agriculture 
! t 
Job 
Growth 
to 1982 
nc 
-38.2 
-38.9 
-18.0 
-38.1 
-31.2 
-7.6 
-21.8 
% 
Increase 
in Total 
Jobs due 
to 2 
Agrie. 
ne 
-6.5 
-3-3 
-0.6 
-5.3 
-6.9 
-0.6 
-2.0 
Share 
of Jobs 
in 1970 
33.1 
35.7 
17.6 
13-2 
38.9 
39.8 
29.8 
38.0 
Industry 
Job 
Growth 
to 1982 
3-8 
7.1 
-16.0 
-28.1 
-10.9 
0.1 
11.5 
-15.0 
% 
Increase 
in Total 
Jobs due 
to 2 
Industry 
1.3 
2.6 
-7.6 
-12.1 
-1.2 
nc 
1.3 
-5.7 
t χ 
Share 
of Jobs 
in 1970 
62.3 
17.1 
13-7 
53-6 
17.2 
10.1 
62.6 
53-9 
Services 
% = 
Job Growth to 1982 
10.5 
31.1 
15.8 
8.1 
26.9 
31.2 
19.0 
32.0 
t 
Increase in Total Jobs due to 2 Services 
25.2 
11.7 
6.9 
8.5 
12.7 
13-7 
30.7 
17.2 
t 
Total Job Growth 3 Achieved 
26.5 
10.9 
-1.0 
-1.0 
3.1 
7.1 
31.1 
9.1 
1. Growth of labor force as percent of 1970 job base; i.e., percent growth of jobs required to employ all newcomers. 
2. Calculated from numbers on this chart (leading to greater rounding error). 
3. Calculated directly from source. 
1. Data for 1982 is preliminary. 
Source: Calculated from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Statistical Supplement to International Comparisons of Un­
employment, Bulletin 1979, May 1985. (See our Appendix for reproduction of relevant tables.) 
4b 
TABLE 1.6 
Average annual percentage change in real gross domestic product* 
(GDP) and productivity, output and employment in manufacturing in 
selected industrialized countries: 1960 - 1983. 
YEAR 
Real GDP 
1960-1973 
1973-1983 
Productivity** 
1960-1973 
1973-1983 
Output 
1960-1973 
1973-1983 
Employment 
1960-1973 
1973-1983 
United 
States 
4.1 
2.0 
3.0 
1.9 
4.7 
1.6 
1.5 
-0.1 
France 
5.6 
2.2 
6.7 
4.6 
7.3 
2.0 
1.1 
-1.6 
Germany 
4.4 
1.6 
5.7 
3.5 
5.2 
1.2 
0.3 
-1.4 
Italy 
5.3 
1.8 
6.9 
3.6 
6.8 
2.5 
1.4 
-0.5 
UK 
3.2 
0.9 
4.4 
2.0 
3.0 
-2.0 
-0.6 
-3.4 
* Own country price weights 
** Output per hour 
Source: "International Comparisons of Manufacturing, Productivity 
and Labor Cost Trends: Preliminary measures for 1983," 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, News. May 31, 1984; 
"Comparative Real Gross Domestic Product, Real GDP per 
capita and Real GDP per Employed Persons: 1950-1983," May 
1984, p. 12. 
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participation.5 We know that due to self-imposed changes in 
laws regarding foreign guest workers in 1973, many European 
countries can no longer count on a labor force which dramatically 
swells or contracts along with the demand for labor. 
We know that all advanced countries are experiencing a dramatic 
shift from industrial employment to employment in the service 
sectors, just as we all shifted from agriculture to industry 
earlier on. 
While the implications of all this are less clear, we nonethe-
less suggest the following: 
o The U.S. is further along the shift to services than is 
Europe. 
o This shift implies lower productivity of labor, on average, 
but more jobs due to the human intensive nature of the 
service sector. 
o This shift has both positive and negative impacts on the 
labor force, since it implies more jobs but lower wages, on 
average. 
o But for advanced countries, the shift is probably inevita-
ble, such that "do we want to or don't we?" is not the 
relevant question so much as "how can we make the transition 
as well as possible and end up with the best mix of employ-
ment opportunities?" 
From this perspective, the difference between the U.S. and Europe 
from 1970-1984 is that the U.S. entered the period having already 
shifted further into services — with 62.3 percent employment 
there in 1970, versus an average of 46.2 percent for the four 
largest European nations listed back in table 1.5 — and was, 
therefore, better able to accommodate a growing workforce of less 
skilled, 1-:3S experienced women and youth. 
But why is the U.S. further along the shift to service sector 
employment.' We believe it is here that the U.S.'s greater 
dynamism, innovativeness and relatively low aversion to risk can 
be credited. In a time of change, with employment in old sectors 
declining and new sectors just emerging, a country's ability to 
shift quickly from old to new will give it an edge in capturing 
the new markets and freeing resources from the old. With its 
relatively greater emphasis on preservation of hard earned 
security, Europe has had a cultural disadvantage in this process. 
Thus one plausible argument is that Europe devoted its resources 
to retooling older, maturing industries, and invested much less 
in the creation, exploration and systematic development of new 
ones. The result was greater productivity in their mature 
The baby boom lag means that Europe must attempt to accommodate 
an influx of young, inexperienced workers for several years to 
come, whereas the U.S. is already over the hump. (See Appendix 
for data on labor force participation by sex in Europe and the 
U : S . ) 
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industries, but consequently less employment in either the old or 
the as yet untapped new sectors.6 Thus they saved the indus­
tries, but are caught with insufficient new job opportunities in 
emerging sectors, as productivity increases in older sectors free 
up labor.? (It is important to note, however, that many 
observers believe the U.S., by not making these same capital 
investments, has created jobs today, but will lose more of the 
manufacturing market all together later down the road. See Mills 
and Lovell in footnote six.) 
1 .6 Labor Force Flexibility: The Source of Dynamism in the U.S. 
Economy? " ~~ 
Assuming that much of the above is true or at least suggestive of 
why the U.S. is adjusting to some aspects of the post 1973 era 
better than Europe, what are the elements that make up the 
greater dynamism of the U.S. economy? 
The primary explanation typically encountered is that the U.S. 
has more flexible labor markets. Without question, labor markets 
are more flexible in the U.S than in Europe. We have greater 
ease of mobility — both for change of residence and for com­
muting to work — due to the size of the nation and consequent 
lack of barriers such as language, visas, and change of culture; 
hence our workers voluntarily change jobs and occupations more 
frequently, change their residence more frequently and move 
further when they do; our unions are less powerful, so that wages 
are presumably more flexible here;" and we have less of a 
"Labor productivity" is another concept often used carelessly. 
Measured as the amount of output that results from a given input 
of labor hours, it may or may not have anything to do with the 
value added by that labor. If a plant fires 300 workers, puts in 
robots, and retains one person to turn the robots on, that 
person's "productivity" will have skyrocketed beyond measure. In 
fact, however, it is the value added by the robot that allows the 
f'.^i. :, _ . : educa a given level of ouput with more (or less) 
effi'ien1: uss of total available resources. Thus some observers 
believe ¡.hat Europe simply traded capital for labor in various 
man ufa·: i .;.!­ing industries, increasing productivity, profits and 
".■■j¿put w ile reducing employment in those industries. 
,?ee, for example, Robert B. McKersie and Werner Sengenberger, 
Job Loss eG in Major Industries: Manpower Strategy Responses 
■'Paris, France: Organisation for Economic Co­operation and 
Development:, 1983), P­20; National Research Council, The 
Competitive Status of the Steel Industry, prepared by the 
Committee on Technology and International Economic and Trade 
I'ssuos, Steel Panel, Office of the Foreign Secretary, National 
/. ;ademy of Engineering and the Commission on Engineering and 
' iohnical Systems (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 
iyo5), PP 79­81, 99; Mills and Lovell in U.S. Competitiveness 
: :\ the World Economy (edited by B. Scott and G. Lodge, Harvard 
business School Press; 1985) p.437­
Sse accompanying paper by Dr. Richard Freeman, Factor Prices, 
ί.,ψΓ oyment, and Inequality in a Decentralized Labor Market 
rprepared for the Commission of European Communities by the 
"■.­»rpc­atior. for Enterprise Development, 1986) on the issue of 
wage flexibility. 
- 7 - . 
social safety net to catch workers made redundant within their 
former occupation (this presumably reduces workers' natural 
tendency to react slowly to the hard facts of needing to change 
occupation or locale). We also have fewer rigidities in the 
demand for labor relative to Europe, such as restrictions and 
added costs regarding lay-offs and plant closings. (Most of the 
sources on the impact of all the above are anecdotal or intui-
tive. See, however, Business Roundtable, "Job Creation: The 
United States and European Experience," 1984; Janet Norwood, 
"Labor Market Contrasts: United States and Europe," Monthly Labor 
Review August 1983; Heidi Fiske, "Europe, Inc.," Inc. Magazine, 
September 1985; and U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, Tech-
nology and Structural Unemployment: Reemploying Displaced Adults, 
1986Î) 
Particularly in an area of rapid and profound change, it is 
imperative that a nation's workforce be able to adjust to changes 
beyond that nation's control. It is not clear, however, nor will 
it be resolved soon, how great an effect any of the labor market 
rigidities discussed above have on job creation over time. We 
assume there is some loss of jobs as a result, but remain 
agnostic as to whether sweeping statements can be made that those 
rigidities created by public policy generate social costs greater 
than the social gains for which they were introduced. (Sweden, 
for example, continues to meet the needs of her people quite 
nicely through a highly evolved welfare state. Her choice may 
not be appropriate for all Americans, but it is not obviously 
inferior as a means of meeting social welfare.) 
Furthermore, while labor markets are critical, they do not 
operate in a vacuum. Labor can be infinitely flexible, yet 
without a steady flow of innovation, new product development and 
marketing, the business sector will not be able to sustain 
adequate demand for labor. 
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II. Public Policies and Job Creation 
Having provided an overview of the job creation performance and 
dynamics of the American economy over the past 15 years, it is 
now possible to discuss the role that public policy has played in 
that performance — and that which it might yet play. In this 
section we look at job creation impacts of three large areas of 
public policy — taxes, regulation, and expenditures. 
In determining the impact of various policies on job creation, 
several points must be kept in mind: 
o First, it is easy to overestimate the impact of public 
policy on job creation. The American job creation ex-
perience is a product of many factors -- cultural, institu-
tional, demographic, technological — and fundamentally an 
economic phenomenon over which public policy may have an 
influence, but one which is certainly not determinative. 
Moreover, since the U.S. has been creating jobs at a 
relatively lively clip (2 million annually) for more than 15 
years, no single set of federal (or state and local) 
policies — even a set as distinct as those of the current 
Administration — can be credited with responsibility for 
the-phenomenon. 
o Given the importance of the entrepreneurial dynamic to the 
job creation experience, greater care should be taken to 
distinguish the roles of aggregate macroeconomic policies 
and microeconomic policies. While the former determine 
overall spending and investment levels, and define the 
"envelope" in which economic activity occurs, the latter may 
be more important in affecting opportunities for combining 
resources in new ways (i.e., entrepreneurship). Moreover, 
as macroeconomic policies become stymied by inherent 
trade-offs (e.g. unemployment versus inflation, efficiency 
.-:.'.::,.... <.H¿i'¿j) the aoiiity of microeconomic policies to side?te n son:.? of these trade-offs becomes more significant. 
o The states have become important economic actors (and to a 
lesser extent, so have localities and neighborhoods). 
Federal policies should not be given exclusive attention. 
The Jta'iis have become particularly important as labora-
tories for the new microeconomic policies. While the 
current impact of these relatively new policies and actors 
is hard to determine, they may well be a better source of 
ideas for more effective "entrepreneurial" policies than the 
federal level. 
o While it is difficult to evaluate the economic impact of 
many public policies, the relative youth of many of the new 
"entrepreneurial policies," as well as their selective 
application, make any thorough evaluation of their effec-
tiveness impossible. 
­ 9 ­
2.1 Tax Policy and Job Creation 
The impact of tax policy on job creation depends upon the 
interaction between the level and type of tax (e.g. personal, 
business, payroll) and the type of business affected (start­up, 
growing, capital intensive, labor intensive). For example, most 
businesses under five years of age do not generate profits, and 
therefore do not pay business income tax; for these businesses 
the level of business tax incentives is meaningless — except as 
it affects their larger or older competitors. Given the dif­
ferential contribution of various sorts of businesses to job 
creation, it is a grave error to talk about the impact of various 
types and levels of taxes on investment without also talking 
about the nature of the investment Induced. We, therefore, ■ 
organize our discussion of tax policy first by the type of tax, 
and within that, by types of business. But first a comment about 
overall tax levels. 
2.1.1 Overall Tax Level 
The overall tax burden in the U.S. (like Japan) has been, and 
remains lower than that of most European countries. (See table 
2.1) 
To what extent can the overall tax burden account for differen­
tial job" creation rates? This is quite difficult to assess. It 
should be noted that there is no consistent pattern among 
countries that lower taxes produce higher job creation rates. For 
example, the United Kingdom with a relatively low tax burden 
underperformed Sweden and France with high tax burdens. (Based 
on the job performance measure provided in the 4th column of 
table 1.4) 
According to Kuttner (Robert Kuttner, The Economic Illusion: 
False Choices Between Prosperity and Social Justice; Houghton 
Mifflin Company; Boston, Massachusetts; 1984) , "...low levels of 
taxation, maldistribution of tax burdens, and restraint of public 
s, ;...._r.g v;: e not the keys to economic performance during the 
pnst decade " Kuttner arrives at this conclusion through an 
international comparison of six countries ­­ Japan, Italy, 
France, Germany, United Kingdom, and United States. According to 
tre author, between 1973 ­ 1979, "...the three industrial 
c un'or ies with the best growth rates, Japan, Italy, and France, 
hed the most rapid growth of public spending. Britain, with slow 
public sector growth, was the worst performer. The United States 
had below­average public sector growth, and about average 
economic growth." (Ibid, p. 191) 
For this reason, to really assess the impact of taxes on job 
creó ".ion, it is necessary to look at the structure of taxes, and 
their impact on the job creating sectors of the economy. 
2 . 1 .¿ Business Income Taxes 
In 1981, the United States Congress cut business income taxes by 
about $150 billion over three years, on the theory that this 
would stimulate investment, growth and job creation. In fact, 
9a 
Table 2.1 
Tax Revenues as a Percentage of GDP 
at market prices 
Canada 
France 
Germany 
Italy« 
Japan 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Total Tax 
1979 
31 
41 
37 
30 
25 
50 
33 
30 
Revenue 
1983 
35 
44 
37 
40 
27 
51 
38 
30 
Personal 
Income Taxes 
1979 
1 1 
5 
1 1 
7 
6 
21 
10 
1 1 
1983 
12 
6 
1 1 
10 
7 
20 
1 1 
12 
Employees» 
Social Security 
Contributions 
1979 
1 
4 
6 
2 
3 
0 
2 
3 
1983 · 
2 
5 
6 
3 
3 
0 
3 
3 
* Last available year 1982. 
Source· Rev :-nue Statistics of OECD Member Countries 1965-1983, 
OECD. 
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business investment dropped sharply during the ensuing recession, 
then increased at a rate significantly above that of previous 
recoveries. (See Table 2.2) 
How much of this increase in investment resulted from the 1981 
tax cuts? 
First, it is important to recognize that the various models of 
investment behavior differ in the relative importance they assign 
to cyclical and profitability factors, as well as the role of the 
cost of capital, and how rapid investment is estimated to respond 
to changes in these factors.9 While most of these studies 
suggest that tax incentives have an impact on investment, there 
is considerable disagreement over the extent of the impact, the 
time frame necessary for the impact to be realized, and the 
proper specification of investment models. 
BoskinIO performed an econometric analysis of the impact of tax 
incentives on investment and concluded that the 1981 Economic 
Recovery Tax Act and the Extended Investment Tax Credit was 
responsible for 20-25Ï of net investment in the United States 
during the 1982-1984 period. Other studies finding that the 
Economic Recovery Tax Act had a positive impact on investment via 
changes in the cost of capital include Hulton and Robertson 
(Charles B. Hulton and James W. Robertson, "The Taxation of High 
Technology Industries," National Tax Journal, 37; September 1984) 
and Jane Gravell (Jane Gravell, "The Treasury Tax Proposals and 
Desired Capital Stocks," unpublished mimeo, 1985). 
On the other hand, an exhaustive study of different model 
specifications (Robert S. Chrinko and Robert Eisner, "The Effects 
of Tax Parameters on the Investment Equations in Macroeconomic 
Economic Models," U.S. Treasury Office of Tax Analysis Paper No. 
47; January I98I) found that changes in the cost of capital via 
tax credits exerted relatively small long-run direct effects on 
investment. Elsewhere, Bischoff (Charles W. Bischoff, "The Effect 
of ''alternative Lag Distributions," in Tax Incentives and Capital 
Spending, edited by G. Fromm; Washington^ The Brookings Institu-
tion, 1971) has argued that while the long-run substitution of 
capital for labor may be large, it cannot be so in the short run, 
since existing capital goods, once built, have fairly fixed labor 
requirements. In other words, in the short-run investment 
behavior is much more likely to be influenced by cyclical 
factors, such as the level of demand and the rate of capacity 
utilization . 
9 One of the best known models has been introduced by Dale W. 
Jorgenson, "Capital Theory and Investment Behavior", American 
Economic Review; May 1963; A host of authors have challenged and 
modified Jorgenson's model, including Robert S. Eisner and M. 
Ishaq Nadiri; "Investment Behavior and Neoclassical Theory", 
Review of Economics and Statistics; August 1968 ; Charles W. 
Bischoff, "The Effect of Alternative Lag Distributions," in Tax 
Incentives and Capital spending, edited by G. Fromm; Washington; 
The Brookings Institution, 1971. 
10 (Michael J. Boskin, The Impact of the 1981-1982 Investment 
Incentives on Business Fixed Investment, National Chamber of 
Commerce ; Washington, DC, 1985) 
10a 
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Ol l iee equipment 
Previous cycle average 
PIX2-X4 
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Table prepared by Barry Bosworth for "Taxes and the 
Investment Recovery" in Brookings Papers on Economic 
Affairs; 1985. Brookings Institution, Washington, 
DC 1985. 
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Whatever the impact of the tax cuts on the overall level invest­
ment, our interest for the purpose of this inquiry is the effect 
of tax cuts on job creation. And to answer this, we need to look 
at the types of investment encouraged as well as its level. 
The bulk of the 1981 business tax cuts came in the form of 
allowing accelerated depreciation of physical assets. The value 
of these cuts was anything but uniform: The prime beneficiaries 
were older, capital intensive, profitable businesses. Eighty 
percent of the benefits of the 1981 cuts went to 2,000 firms 
—the top 1 percent of America's businesses.11 For a year, 
federal law permitted older, capital intensive, unprofitable 
industries to gain further advantage from the tax cuts by 
actually selling their tax deductions to profitable firms. These 
older firms were not creating jobs; the largest 1,000 U.S. firms, 
for that matter, lost jobs slightly during the 1970s (and three 
of their ten million jobs moved overseas during that period). 
More importantly, most of the firms that were creating jobs could 
take little advantage of the tax benefits"! Firms are rarely 
profitable in their first five years, and therefore, do not 
generally owe business income taxes; nor can they take advantage 
of deductions.12 Service sector firms often have few physical 
assets to depreciate. 
It might be that modernization investments induced by the tax 
cuts could lead to increased job creation (or job loss reduction) 
in the long run, but one would expect a lag, and even then there 
is evidence that should cause us to question whether new job 
creation will in fact occur. 
For example, in a recent study, Citizens for Tax Justice found 
absolutely "...no correlation between tax 'incentives' and 
improved capital spending or job creation. (Citizens for Tax 
Justice, Money for Nothing: The Failure of Corporate Tax Incen­
tives , 198Ί-1984; p. 3) The CTJ study is based on a sample of 259 
of the nation's largest and most profitable non-financial 
corporations over the 1981-84 period. The study found that the 
44 non-financial companies in the survey that paid no federal 
income taxes at all — or received net tax refunds — over the 
four years actually reduced investment while the 43 highest tax 
companies increased both investment and employment. The per­
formance of low-tax companies relative to their higher tax 
counterparts is high-lighted in the Table 2.3· According to the 
CTJ study, the highest taxed companies (i.e., those paying at 
least 33 percent of their domestic profits in federal income 
rates) boosted their capital spending by 21 percent and added 
four percent more workers to their payrolls. 
11 Robert S. Mclntyre and Dean C. Tipps, Inequity and Decline 
(Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, T984) 
12 Lawrence Litvak and Belden. Daniels, Innovations in Development 
Finance (Washington, DC: Council of State Planning Agencies, 
1979). 
I l a 
Table 2.3 
Tax Rates à Changes in Investment and Jobs 
For 259 Major Corporations, 1981-84 
CO 
I to 
ω 
OB 
m Λ O 
l ê -
II-
«β φ 
> * 
• β α c « 
- 4 - -
ävflv 
■1.5 -1.6 
0« er Ι · ι * >Ο*.<20* >20*,<33« 
1981-84 Tax Rate Class 
33* or mor· 
From: Citizens for Tax Justice, "Money for Nothino: The Failure of Corporate Tax Incentives, 1981­1935." Washington, DC 1985 
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At the other end of the extreme, the least taxed companies (i.e., 
those either paying no taxes or actually receiving tax rebates) 
reduced their aggregate capital spending by four percent from 
1981 to 1984; they cut their total number of employees by six 
percent over the same period. The study concludes that these 
firms have used their tax rebates for mergers and acquisitions, 
increased dividends, and higher pay for corporate executives 
(Ibid, p. 8). 
The findings of the CTJ study are consistent with those of 
another recent Brookings study (Barry Bosworth, "Taxes and the 
Investment Recovery," Brookings Mimeo; April 1985). According to 
Bosworth, tax incentives explain very little of the rise in 
business investment. Bosworth considers the composition as well 
as the level of investment spending, noting that total business 
fixed investments rose 33 percent in real terms from the fourth 
quarter of 1982 to the fourth quarter of 1984, but that increased 
investment in office equipment (especially computers) and 
business automobiles accounted for most of the aggregate in-
crease. Contending that the 1981 and 1982 tax changes reduced 
the effective tax rate on business automobiles only slightly and 
actually increased the effective tax rate on office equipment, 
Bosworth stresses that tax incentives deserve little credit for 
the investment increase. 
Other studies have questioned the link between taxes and invest-
ment by focusing on trends in federal taxation on corporate 
profits. (See David L. Brumbaugh and Wayne M. Morrison, "Why Some 
Corporations Don't Pay Taxes", Congressional Research Service; 
Report No.35-75E; March 22, 1985.) 
These studies attempt to assess the hypothesis that high taxes on 
corporate profits have prompted an investment crisis. If this 
hypothesis were correct, then it would follow that tax cuts on 
corporate profits should stimulate investment. However, a host 
of studies confirm that the effective corporate tax rate has been 
declining and is relatively low. The Congressional Research 
Service notes that due to the wide array of tax deductions, 
exemptions, exclusions, and credits, many corporations pay far 
le.ss than the statutory rate that the U.S. tax code applies to 
moot taxable corporate income. 
Finally, there are a host of studies suggesting that the poten-
tial benefits of specific tax incentives must be balanced against 
possible distortions in investment decisions. (Two examples are: 
Alan Auerbach and Dale Jorgenson, "The First Year Capital 
Recovery System", 1979; Federal Reserve Board, Public Policy and 
Capital Formation; I98I) The primary critique of most of these 
studies is that distortions in investment patterns caused by tax 
preferences are intrinsically bad because they substitute tax 
factors for economic forces when investment decisions are made. 
These distortions are virtually inevitable when profits from 
investments in different assets are taxed at different effective 
tax rates. The concern with potential distortions prompted the 
Federal Reserve Board to remark: "While finding the overall rate 
of capital formation is probably adequate, this study concludes 
that'the existing capital stock is misallocated, probably 
seriously, among sectors of the economy and types of capital, 
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primarily because of distortions caused by inflation and U.S. tax 
laws. The biases are substantial...as a result capital is not 
applied to its most efficient uses." 
Likewise, the 1981 Economic Report of the President acknowledged 
distortions caused by the Accelerated Cost Recovery System: "ACRS 
does not treat all types of business investment equally"; it 
"...is relatively more favorable to investment in short­lived 
equipment. Tax rates vary across industries...Effective tax 
rates on new equipment are negative for some industries." 
Others claim that as the maze of tax incentives expands, the 
maximum gap between effective tax rates on different types of 
investment will increase, exerting further pressure to base 
investment decisions on tax considerations, not market forces. 
(For data on the growing gap between the highest and lowest 
effective corporate tax rates on different types of investments, 
see the following: The Economic Report of the President, 1982; 
Robert S. Mclntyre and Dean C. Tipps, Inequity and Decline^ 
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities; Washington, DC 1983; 
Wayne M. Morrison, Why Some Corporations Don't Pay Taxes Con­
gressional Research Service; Report No. 85­75E; March 22, 1985.) 
There are, of course, other sorts of business taxes and tax 
incentives. States particularly have used property tax abate­
ments and tax reductions to induce plants to locate within their 
borders. But few would argue that such incentives do more than 
affect the location of economic activity and jobs, and there is 
considerable doubt that business tax incentives are effective or 
efficient in doing even that.13 
One source of U.S. job creation that is often overlooked is the 
non­profit or third sector. (Both as direct creators of jobs — 
the sector which includes universities, hospitals and churches 
employs one­fifth of the labor force — and as cultivators of 
private initiative which spills over into the for­profit sector.) 
The size and vitality of this sector is undoubtedly related to 
„he f <Λ.. ι, chat it is exempt from most federal and state business 
taxes ¡ ar.d that private contributions to a subset of the sector 
are deductible from personal income taxes. However, we do not 
kno^ tne job impact of this exemption. 
Our review of the literature leads us to conclude that: 
o It is doubtful that business tax reductions produce signifi­
cant increases in business investment; 
o To the extent they do, it is in the very firms that are 
least Likely to create large numbers of new jobs, at least 
directly; and 
13 Roger Vaughan, State Taxation and Economic Development (Washing­
ton, DC: Council of State Planning Agencies, 1979); Michael 
Kieschnick, Taxes and Growth (Washington, DC: Council of State 
Planning Agencies, 1982); Roger Schmenner, Making Business 
Location Decisions (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice­Hall, 
Inc., 1982.) 
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o They can create uneconomic distortions in investment 
behavior (which is particularly destructive in a time of 
rapid change and innovation where the best guarantee of 
intelligent investment decisions is to have lots of in-
vestors making individual decisions based on economic, not 
tax, criteria). 
2.1.3 Personal Income Taxes 
Reductions in personal income tax rates are often given credit 
for American job creation. Again, while they have had some 
effect, we conclude that their contribution is usually over-
stated. 
Most of the 1981 tax cuts — roughly $600 billion over three 
years — went toward reducing individual income taxes. Savings 
(investment) rates have not increased as a result; in fact, 
individual savings rates have fallen. The reasons for this are 
probably many: 
o People invest based on the basis of perceived returns; such 
perceptions were clouded by the récession. 
o Tax savings may be (and evidently were) used to increase 
consumption or leisure, and need not be invested. 
o To the extent tax savings found their way into investment, 
the application of this investment would be mediated by the 
behavior of the institutions (e.g., banks, savings and 
loans, brokers) through whom the funds were invested. Often 
these financial institutions find it difficult to invest in 
smaller, younger, and collateral-poor businesses since 
information and transaction costs are high. 
The growth of the venture capital industry in the late 1970s is 
often giv3h credit for the growth of entrepreneurship, and a cut 
in capital gains rates in 1978 is given credit for the growth of 
venture capital. Few would dispute that the reduction in capital 
gains rates contributed to the growth of the venture capital 
industry and in turn to the growth of entrepreneurship, but its 
impact is usually overstated: 
o The growing importance of entrepreneurship started well 
before the growth of the venture capital industry. 
o The venture capital industry, while showing dispropor-
tionately large returns in terms of employment, profita-
bility, and innovation, is still quite small — roughly $20 
billion in a $5 trillion economy. Each year it invests in 
only a few thousand of 650,000 new businesses, and in a 
relatively few sectors (high technology chief among them) 
and states. 
o The attractive rates of return offered by venture capital 
funds — an average of 25Í after-tax annual rates of return 
— must be given some credit for attracting investment. 
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o Changes in the regulation of pension funds has played a 
critical role in the development of the Industry. In 1978, 
along with the capital gains reduction, the U.S. Department 
of Labor was revising the interpretation of the Employee 
Retirement Investment Security Act of 1973 (ERISA). Prior to 
1978, the Department of Labor asserted that venture capital 
was "too risky" an investment for private pension funds. 
After 1978, however, the Department of Labor agreed that 
such investing could be examined in the context of a fund's 
overall investment strategy, thereby freeing funds to place 
a small portion of their assets in venture capital. States 
also began to allow public pension funds to invest a portion 
of their assets in venture capital. By 1982, pension funds 
were providing one­third of the new funds committed to 
privately managed venture capital pools. In addition, 
non­taxed endowments and foundations are making substantial 
commitments to venture capital, In total, tax­exempt 
investors are responsible for providing approximately 40 
percent of new capital financing into the venture capital 
industry. It is, to put it mildly, unlikely that the 
behavior of these investors was significantly influenced by 
cuts in the capital gains tax. (See Kieschnick in "The 
Venture Capital Boom," Politics and Markets, Washington, DC: 
The Gallatin Institute, February 1984.) 
The ability of personal tax cuts to influence investment in 
entrepreneurship is limited by the fact that they are relatively 
blunt instruments — inevitably providing windfalls to people who 
do not change their behavior as a result. Cost effective 
incentives need to be carefully designed. There are ways that 
both the federal and state tax codes might stimulate investment 
in entrepreneurship. 
o Reducing the favorable treatment accorded real estate 
development which draws investment away from business 
d ev·? ' " ρτ.­ent, for example, by capping or eliminating the 
mort;'.?ge interest deduction as proposed by the U.S. 
Treasiry'a 1984 Tax Reform package. 
o Allovi.ig equity investments in new ventures in depressed 
areas .0 be written off as losses upon investment. 
flailing capital gains rates on non­productive investment 
(e.g. collectibles) and reducing rates on productive 
investment as California and New York have done. 
o Pt cvid.'.ng tax credits for investments in state­chartered 
ventur» capital corporations as Indiana and Wisconsin have 
doni 
2.2 Hîgulat.'.on and Job Creation 
This stctio 1 summarizes the course of deregulation over the past 
do.ïen years, che benefits deregulation was expected to produce, 
and what is known about the impact to date. All conclusions in 
tnr'.s ar:­i ¡PUSt be extremely tentative. Various industries remain 
in deregul­'itory mid­stream, and it is even possible that unfore­
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seen changes combined with a new President could result in 
re-regulátion. No study has yet tried to assess the overall 
impact of deregulation; the primitive "state of the art" would 
render any such study methodologically suspect. 
The impact of deregulation on job creation is especially un-
certain. Improved efficiency, however defined, and not job 
creation, is usually considered the proper goal of deregulation. 
Therefore if increased efficiency is accompanied by job losses in 
an industry (which has in fact occurred), many observers would 
not conclude that the reform had necessarily failed. Moreover, 
in the real world (e.g., the severe recessions of the early. 
1980s) it is extremely difficult to apportion job losses in 
deregulated industries to one factor over another. Finally, if 
deregulation does stimulate job creation, it is likely to occur 
outside the deregulated industry, and would not be measured by 
industry-specfie studies. 
2.2.1 Background 
The past dozen years have witnessed the rise and pause of an 
unprecedented deregulatory movement in the United States. 
Regulations instituted over the past century to protect the 
public against either monopolies or the drawbacks of a market 
economy'were attacked for aiding monopolies and hindering 
economic growth. 
The deregulatory debate moved to the forefront of national 
attention in early 198I when President Reagan made it one of the 
cornerstones of his economic program (the other three were budget 
and tax cuts and a restrictive monetary policy). According, to 
Reagan, unnecessary regulations were costing American businesses 
over $100 billion annually and had been a major cause of the slow 
growth of the 1970s. 
Although in a sense regulation constitutes everything that the 
federal government does, the regulation debate in the U.S. is 
usually focused on two types of regulation: economic and 
social. Economic regulation controls prices, condition of market 
entry and exit, and conditions of service in specific industries 
thought to require regulation to protect the public interest. 
Some examples are the airline, trucking, telecommunications, 
financial, and railroad industries. By contrast, social regula-
tion is generally not industry-specific, but instead attempts to 
protect the environment, workers' health and safety, and consumer 
safety by regulating a variety of industries. The Environmental 
Protection Agency, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, and 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration are examples of 
social regulatory agencies. The two categories do overlap to 
some extent (e.g., the National Highway Traffic Safety Admini-
stration represents social regulation applied to the auto 
industry), but the division is still extremely useful in ex-
amining the history of deregulation. 
Economic deregulation was accomplished primarily in the 1975-1980 
period, during the presidencies, of Republican Gerald Ford and 
Democrat Jimmy Carter. Several factors combined to provide a 
catalyst for deregulation: (1) unanimity among economists and 
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political scientists that competition instead of regulation would 
better serve the public interest; (2) broad political discontent 
with the status quo by free market conservatives, liberals such 
as Senator Edward Kennedy, and consumer advocate Ralph Nader; (3) 
an altered economic environment caused by high inflation and 
technological innovation which provided an impetus for change; 
and (4) increasing distrust and dissatisfaction with government 
produced by the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal. (See 
especially Martha Derthick and Paul J. Quirk, The Politics of 
Deregulation, Brookings Institution, 1985.) 
The result was a remarkable series of successful deregulatory 
efforts in the airline, trucking, financial and railroad indus­
tries between 1975 and 1980. Interestingly, at the same time the 
Carter Administration undertook a serious effort to strengthen 
social regulations in a variety of areas. Reforms in this area 
were limited to attempts to improve the regulatory process and 
introduce greater rationality into the system. 
Advocates of economic deregulation — which included nearly 
everyone outside the affected industries by the late 1970s — 
believed it would directly lead to lower prices, increased 
efficiency, and greater innovation. These effects would in turn 
stimulate economic growth and concomitant job creation. Aside 
from costs associated with making a transition to deregulation, 
it was commonly believed that few if any problems would be caused 
by retrieving the government's visible hand from these indus­
tries . 
While economic deregulation was being implemented, the groundwork 
was being laid for social deregulation. Unlike economic regula­
tion, it was clear that social regulation conferred important 
benefits on the public. The question increasingly raised here, 
by business groups as well as some economists, was whether the 
costs of regulation were outstripping the benefits. A ground­
breaking and controversial study by Murray Weidenbaum (Murray L. 
Weidenbaum and Robert DeFina, The Cost of Federal Regulation of 
Ei. o nom i u Ajtiviny, American Enterprise Institute, 1978) — later 
Prt Vident "fis« gan's first chair of the Council of Economic 
Advisors ­■­ was the basis for Reagan's claims that social 
regulations cost an unnecessary $100 billion annually. Their use 
of cost­benefit analysis (CBA), which suffered among other 
ici sets from the need of placing a monetary value on the benefits 
of good health or even life itself, was subjected to much 
criticism. (See especially Mark Green and Norman Waitzman, 
Business War on the Law, Corporate Accountability Research Group; 197ΤΠ 
As noted earlier, President Ronald Reagan elevated the issue to 
national attention in 198I. Although his Administration did 
continue economic deregulatory efforts (in the busing industry 
and further deregulation of the financial industry), the primary 
focus of its program was social deregulation. The Administration 
moved to centralize authority for the regulatory process in the 
White House's Office of Management and Budget; reduce regulatory 
activity by drastically cutting the budget of the agencies 
involved; appoint people to head the regulatory agencies who were 
m 
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opposed to regulation; create a Presidential Task Force on 
Regulatory Relief headed by Vice President George Bush; and seek 
legislative reform. 
In contrast to economic deregulation, no consensus on social 
deregulation existed with regard to the Reagan program. In fact, 
public opinion polls showed that if anything the public wanted 
health and safety regulations strengthened (see New York Times, 
"Rising Concern on Consumer Issues in Found in Harris Poll," Feb. 
17, 1983 and Mark Green, "The Gang That Can't Deregulate," New 
Republic, March 21, 1983) - Several Supreme Court decisions 
severely limited the use of CBA in setting regulations, and. 
scandals in the Environmental Protection Agency effectively 
halted the Administration's efforts in 1983. No social regula-
tory reform legislation has been passed, and proposals to 
delegate regulatory authority to the states were abandoned. The 
Administration's program had its greatest impact through refusing 
to issue new regulations and relaxing enforcement of rules 
already on the books. 
2.2.2 The Results of Deregulation 
It is important to reeraphasize that the deregulated Industries 
are still in a period of transition, making all conclusions in 
this area extremely tentative. Nevertheless, the following is a 
summary of what is known about the Impact of deregulation in 
several areas. 
To date, airline deregulation appears to have been a success. The 
U.S General Accounting Office (GAO) concluded that deregulation 
resulted in lower air fares, increased operating efficiency, and 
better consumer service. Although the industry underwent its 
worst financial performance in its history during the six years 
following deregulation in 1978, the situation had rebounded by 
mid-1983. The following year witnessed the highest operating 
profit for the industry in 11 years. ("Deregulation: Increased 
Competition is Making Airlines More Efficient and Responsive to 
Consumers,'1 GAO, Nov. 6, 1985). However, some observers are 
concerned that concentration is beginning to occur in the airline 
industry. 
Telecommunications deregulation did not occur until January 1, 
1984 with the break-up of the American Telephone and Telegraph 
monopoly, making it too early to determine what the overall 
impact has been. Some obvious benefits have been greater 
innovation and product diversification, more rapid introduction 
of new technologies, and lower long distance rates and equipment · 
costs. However, the transitional period has also seen abundant 
confusion, high residential rates, increased service costs 
accompanied by poorer service, concerns about affordable phone 
service for the poor, and the threat that large phone users will 
bypass the system to save money and thereby endanger a unified 
telecommunications network. 
Similarly, there has been no clearcut result issuing from 
financial deregulation. Changes have occurred primarily in three 
areas: 1) price deregulation (e.g., the removal of ceilings on 
interest-bearing accounts); geographic deregulation (e.g., 
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interstate banking); and 3) product diversification (e.g., the 
expansion of services by banks into non-traditional areas, and 
the expansion of securities firms and insurance companies into 
deposit services traditionally offered only by banks). The last 
two changes (especially product diversification) have developed 
more as a result of financial institutions circumventing existing 
law than because of government deregulation. The primary effect 
of the changes has been to make various financial institutions 
more similar in terras of the services they provide. 
Financial deregulation has probably made the flow of funds more 
efficient. However, observers disagree on whether the reforms 
have driven interest rates higher, thereby making credit less 
available. Given the fact that regulatory response is now 
clearly following industry-led changes, it is likely that we have 
not seen the end of regulatory reform in the financial area. 
Serious concerns have been raised about possible concentration in 
the industry, the threat to financial stability, and the possi-
bility of conflicts of interest in the emerging diversified 
financial organizations. 
On a more positive note, some states are now changing the way 
financial institutions are regulated to encourage more aggressive 
investments in economic development: 
o Massachusetts is using a Community Reinvestment Act to tie 
approvals of expansion of bank powers to banks' record of 
meeting the credit needs of their communities. 
o California has passed, and Michigan is likely to soon pass, 
"loan loss reserve" programs to encourage bank loans to 
growing businesses. 
o Several states have loan guarantee programs to encourage 
more aggressive bank lending. 
o Several states are simplifying securities regulation to make 
small of'! årings of securities in new firms easier and 
cheaper. 
If the evidence on the overall impact of deregulation is somewhat 
inconclusive, it is no surprise that the impact on job creation 
It, even more so. However, increased competition does seem to 
have exerted a downward pressure on wages in the deregulated 
transportation industries. Average airline compensation costs in 
constant dollars declined six percent over 1978-1984. Employment 
has declined in the airline and railroad industries (employment 
had been declining in the latter before deregulation), but it is 
une ear, gi/en the recession, how much of this can be attributed 
to ueregulation. 
Assessing the impact of social deregulation is even more diffi-
cult because it affected a broad variety of industries and 
because of the Reagan Administration's ineffectiveness in 
implementing its reforms. The only independent study which has 
been performed to date is that of the Urban Institute, which will 
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be relied upon heavily for the following assessment (George C. 
Eads and Michael Fix, Relief or Reform? Reagan's Regulatory 
Dilemma, Urban Institute Press, 1984. ) 
Reviewing the evidence which led to the social deregulatory 
movement, the authors conclude that "Regulation may have hurt 
economic growth, depressed the rate of growth of productivity, 
and caused the rate of inflation to be higher than it otherwise 
would have been, but regulation cannot be blamed — at least on 
the basis of the evidence examined here — for more than a small 
fraction of the economy's poor performance in any of these 
dimensions." (Ibid. p.18) However, the authors also caution that 
factors currently not amenable to measurement could radically 
alter this conclusion. 
The Urban Institute examined the Administration's claimed savings 
resulting from its deregulatory efforts, which were made at the 
time the Task Force on Regulatory Relief disbanded in August 
1983. The Administration claimed one-time savings of $15.2-17.2 
billion plus additional annual savings of $13.5-13-9 billion. The 
Institute concluded, "Evidence strongly suggests, however, that 
the effect of much of this claimed saving to business was 
questionable at best." The Institute noted that the most 
seriously questionable items "add up to about two-thirds of the 
total claimed,". (John L. Palmer and Isabel V. Sawhill (Eds.), The 
Reagan Record, Ballinger Publishing Co., 1984, p. 309) and called 
the actual savings to business "clearly modest." (p. 31Ό 
As an interesting sidelight to the questions of the cost of 
social regulations, the Urban Institute noted, "Our survey of 
business executives suggests that although they find complying 
with regulations annoying and time consuming, in most instances, 
they do not believe (at least in the early 1980s) that regula­
tions reduce profitability substantially." (p.309) 
The area of social regulation which has entailed the greatest 
costs is environmental regulation. The nonpartisan Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) studied the impact of environmental rules on 
productivity. 
"The results of this analysis indicate that environmental 
regulation has not been a significant source of productivity 
losses in the private sector. The output and productivity 
losses attributable to environmental regulation in the 
United States have been slightly larger than those experi­
enced in the three other nations studied — Canada, Japan, 
and the Federal Republic of Germany — but they are nonethe- . 
less small in magnitude. Moreover, the economic losses 
attributable to environmental regulation, in terras of both 
measured output and productivity, appear to have declined 
over time." 
CBO's findings on productivity are generally comparable with 
other studies. ("Environmental Regulation and Economic Effici­
ency," CBO, March 1985, pp. xii, xvi) 
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Given the paucity of information on the subject, it is difficult 
to reach any conclusion on the impact of social deregulation on 
job creation. The Urban Institute noted, "Regulation actually 
seemed, on balance, to increase employment." ("Relief or 
Reform?", p. 89, emphasis in original). The best guess, however, 
is that the impact of either social regulation or deregulation on 
job creation has been small. 
2.2.3 Several conclusions emanate from the foregoing review: 
0 The impact of deregulation on job creation is not clear but 
it is unlikely that recent deregulatory moves have been a 
significant cause of job creation. The nexus between · 
deregulation and economic growth and job creation has not 
definitely been established, but a correlation between 
efficiency and growth is extremely likely. 
o More research needs to be done on the relative costs and 
benefits of deregulation. Because the economy is still in a 
period of deregulatory adjustment, it is uncertain whether 
or not the drawbacks to deregulation (e.g., possible 
concentration in industry) may eventually outweigh the 
benefits. 
o Although it is probable that social deregulation has reduced 
costs to businesses, it is not clear that the net economic 
costs to society were reduced as well, and it is possible 
that this question may never be answered definitively. Also, 
some sort of regulation may, in fact, create jobs. 
o States are pinpointing their deregulatory efforts to en­
courage investment in young firms and reduce barriers to 
start-ups. 
2.3 Federal Expenditures and Job Creation 
oj.nue t.-ie New Deal, the federal government has played a critical 
role as a ruajor actor in the economy. This section examines the 
rc\-i of dei.lelt spending, direct federal spending in two areas 
(d'."-f-in;:e and health care), and human capital investment as 
contributors to the U.S. job creation experience. 
2.3.1 Deficit Spending 
Contrary to popular belief, federal fiscal policy was not 
expansionary during the latter 1970s. After the economy emerged 
from the mid 1970s recession, both federal outlays and the 
deficit were reasonably stable. Measured as a proportion of the 
Gross Natio ai Product (GNP), outlays constituted roughly 21-22 
percent οι" 'Vu? during that period and deficits were about 2 
percent of GNP. In the early 1980s, outlays ranged from roughly 
23-25 percent of GNP, and the deficit fluctuated between about 
4-6 percent of GNP, but overall macro policy remained restrictive 
due to extremely tight monetary policy. (The Economic and Budget 
Outlook: Fiscal Years 1986-1990, CBO, February 1985, p. 160. ) 
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Since then, the extraordinary deficits, combined with less 
oppressive monetary policy have led to enormous job growth in 
1984 — over 4 million jobs, compared to a loss of over 1.3 
million in 1983. Of course, much of this most recent increase is 
attributable to the recovery from the severe recession of the 
early 1980s. Thus, a significant portion of 1984's job growth 
can be credited to the recovery from a deep recession and 
unprecedented peace-time deficits. (CBO attributed the greatest 
influence on the deficit to tax cuts, as defense increases and 
non-defense budget cuts roughly cancel each other out. Because 
the tax cuts reduced government revenue on a long-terra basis, the 
result was built-in, or structural, deficits.) This accounts for 
1984 job growth. 
Macro policy does not account, however, for sustained U.S. job 
growth over the 15 year period from 1970-1985. Although macro 
policy can provide a more stable environment for economic 
activity, it cannot sustain an expansion in employment beyond the 
"full employment" level without incurring massive and acceler-
ating inflation. This does not appear to be the case in the U.S. 
over this period. 
Note, however, that some observers have argued that European 
nations, have not stimulated their economies even to the capacity 
possible under normal keynesian assumptions — i.e., that much 
of Europe's unemployment over the last decade could have been 
addressed by macroeconomic policies but was not due to incorrect 
assumptions and fears of inflationary consequences. (See, for 
example, James Tobin in Unemployment and Growth in the Western 
Economies, edited by Andrew J. Pierre, New York, New York: 
Council on Foreign Relations, 1984.) 
2.3-2 Military Spending 
Some observers have pointed to recent military spending increases 
as a potent factor in Job creation. On the other hand, opponents 
of these increases have argued that military spending creates 
significantly less jobs per dollar than other forms of federal 
spending. 
Over the 1970-1984 period, military spending has not grown at all 
($94.0 vs. $93-9 billion) in real (constant 1972 dollar) terras, 
primarily because the United States was involved in the Vietnam 
War at the beginning of this period. However, in the post-
Vietnam War era (1974-1984), military spending grew in real terms 
by 34.9 percent. Over nine-tenths of this growth has occurred 
since 198O. (Statistical Abstract of the United States, U.S. 
Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1985, Table 490, p. 
308.) 
Although defense spending has increased greatly, this increase 
has been more than offset by non-defense cuts, according to the 
Congressional Budget Office. Thus, whatever job creation impact 
the defense build-up may have had has been negated by reduction 
in non-defense spending. (CBO, p. 155.) 
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On the question of whether equivalent spending in defense versus 
non-defense will produce more jobs, two careful studies have been 
done (both, however, used the same econometric model). CBO 
concluded that "Additional dollars spent on defense should 
provide more or less the same employment as additional dollars 
spent on most non-defense products." (Defense Spending and the 
Economy, CBO, February 1983, p. xiii.) The Congressional 
Research Service (CRS) concluded that non-defense spending would 
produce slightly more jobs. CRS estimated that shifting $10 
billion (in 1972 dollars) from defense to non-defense spending 
would create an additional 30,000 jobs (about 8 percent more 
jobs). (Carolyn Kay Brancato and Linda LeGrande, The Impact of 
Defense Spending on Employment, CRS Report No. 82-182E, November 
4, 1982, p. 4.) 
Finally, research by Gordon Adams indicates that military 
spending does not create more or less jobs than other types of 
federal spending, but that it does affect different sectors of 
the economy and workforce in different ways. (Adams, G. and 
Gold, D.H., "The Economics of Military Spending: Is the Military 
Dollar Really Different?" Defense Budget Project, Center on 
Budget and Policy Priorities, Washington, DC, December 1985.) One 
hypothesis put forward by others is that concentrated defense 
spending on research and development activities led to the growth 
of the high-tech industry in the U.S. This is certainly a 
plausible argument (though comparable growth could doubtlessly 
have been achieved by civilian R&D spending of a comparable 
level) . 
2.3.3 Health Care Spending 
Another source of job creation in recent years may have been the 
large growth in health care spending, according to some ob-
servers. Over the 1970-83 period, employment in hospitals and 
health services grew by 76.1 percent, almost three times as fast 
as overall industrial employment (28.2 percent). (Statistical 
Abstract, Table 578, p. 404.) 
Over the same period, the real (adjusted for inflation in medical 
care) growth of health care spending was 61.9 percent. As a 
proportion of GNP, health care expenditures rose from 7.5 to 10.8 
percent from 1970 to 1983 - (Robert M. Gibson, et al, National 
Health Expenditures, 1982, Health Care Financing Review, Fall 
1983. 
Some, but not much, of this increase was due to such demographic 
factors as the aging of the population. The Congressional 
Research Service (CRS) examined the reasons for the growth 
spending over the 1972-92 period. CRS attributed two-thirds 
(67-2 percent) of the growth to either general inflation or 
inflation specifically in medical care. Only 7.7 percent was 
attributed to demographic factors. The remaining one quarter 
(25.1 percent) of the growth was due to real increases in per 
capita use of health care services. (Janet Pernice Lundy, Health 
Care Cost Containment, CRS Issue Brief No. IB83172, November 20, 
1984, pp. 4-5.) 
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While it is likely that federal health care spending (primarily 
Medicare and Medicaid) was an extremely important factor in this 
growth, it may not have been the most important influence. While 
federal spending in this area led the way with 97.5 percent real 
growth over 1970-83, private sector health care spending also 
grew at a strong rate of 50 percent (adjusted for inflation). In 
fact, about half of the real growth in overall health spending 
over 1970-83 is attributable to the private sector, as compared 
to somewhat over a third (37 percent) due to federal spending. 
(Gibson, et al — all figures adjusted for medical care infla-
tion .) 
How much of this private sector growth would have occurred in the 
absence of a strong federal stimulus in health care is difficult 
to determine. Nevertheless, it is clear that the private sector 
played an extremely important role in the growth of health care 
spending and the job creation which resulted from it. 
2.3-4 Human Capital Spending 
Human capital refers to the skill level and knowledge of the 
workforce. Human capital proponents propose that investments in 
human beings is as important, if not more so, than investment in 
physical capital. This section examines what is known about the 
education and training of the workforce, and the impact of human 
capital on economic growth. 
According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the 
proportion of the 18-64-year-old civilian labor force with at 
least a high school education rose from 66.4 percent in 1970 to 
82.0 percent in 1983· Those with four or more years of college 
rose from 12.9 to 21.0 percent during that same period. (Educa-
tional Attainment of Workers, March 1982-83, U.S. Dept. of Labor, 
BLS, April 1984, Table B-1, p.10.) 
There are strong indications from a variety of sources, however, 
that the quality of education declined in the 1970s. (See Dave 
M. O'Neill and Peter Sepielli, Education in the United States: 
1940-I983, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, July 1985, 
Chapter 3.) However, this does not affect the average increased 
educational level of the workforce, as labor force entrants still 
have more education than the elderly persons retiring from the 
workforce. 
In addition to education, the last two decades have seen a large 
investment by the federal government in employment and training 
programs. Because the number of participants enrolled does not 
provide a very accurate description of the total effort (en-
rollees received a disparate range of services) , overall expendi-
ture data will be reviewed to provide some measure of the 
government investment in employment and training. 
The most careful assessment has been performed by Gary Orfield of 
the University of Chicago, who compared constant dollar expendi-
tures in employment and training for fiscal years 1975-84. In 
constant dollar terms, federal, spending on training (including 
vocational education but excluding public jobs programs) rose 
from $3.0 billion in 1975 to $4.3 billion in 198O, a 44 percent 
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increase. From 1980 to 1984 training expenditures decreased to 
$2.4 billion, a drop of 44.5 percent. Over the entire 1975-84 
period, federal investment in training declined 20 percent. (The 
Federal Budget and Shrinking Resources for Job Training, Report 
No. 1, Illinois Unemployment and Job Training Research Project, 
University of Chicago, April 25, 1985, p. 7·) 
Some measure of the extent of private sector training, as well as 
the scope of adult education generally, is provided by a new 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) survey. The survey questioned 
workers about how they obtained 1) training to qualify for their 
current job and 2) training to improve their skills at their 
present job. Unfortunately, the survey did not investigate' 
either how rauch was spent on this training or who paid for it. 
Also, since it has only been conducted once, no historical 
comparisons are possible. BLS found that 55 percent of workers 
required training for their current position. Some 29 percent of 
workers received their qualifying training in school, 28 percent 
through informal on-the-job training, and 10 percent through a 
formal company program (the figures are not additive since 
respondents could choose more than one category). 
Slightly over a third of all workers (35 percent) took skill 
improvement training at their current job. About 12 percent of 
all workers received this training through a school, 11 percent 
through a formal company program, and 14 percent through informal 
on-the-job training. (How Workers Get Their Training, U.S. Dept. 
of Labor, BLS, February I985, pp. 21, 39.) 
In short, the study confirms that there is a large private sector 
investment in training. Workers believe that they receive 
relatively more of their necessary qualifying training from 
previous jobs than from school, and a large group of workers is 
receiving skill improvement training at their current job. While 
no historical comparison is available, it is likely that this 
high level of employment-based training has been occurring for 
£.ome ti;¿e. 
The most careful work in assessing how much human capital 
investment has contributed to economic growth has been performed 
by Edward Denison of the Brookings Institution. (Edward F. 
Denison, Trends in American Economic Growth, 1929-1982, Brookings 
Institution, 1985.) Denison divides the causes of economic 
growth into two categories: 1) changes in factor input (labor, 
capital, and land), and 2) changes in output per unit of input. 
The two areas of Denison*s analysis most closely related to human 
capital are education (a portion of labor's factor input) and 
advances in knowledge (the most important cause of increasing 
output per unit of input). For the entire 1929-1982 period, 
human capital factors were the most important cause of growth: 
education per worker was responsible for 14 percent and advances 
in knowledge for 28 percent, for a total of 42 percent. This 
compares with the next two largest causes, labor input except 
education (32 percent) and capital (19 percent). (Denison, p. 
30.) 
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For the 1973-82 period, education was an even greater factor, 
accounting for 30 percent of economic growth. However, advances 
in knowledge turned slightly negative during the same period, and 
output per unit declined as a whole. (Table 8-1, p. 111.) 
Denison acknowledges that it is unclear what is causing this 
recent decline (p.30), but he believes it is attributable to a 
number of factors and not to a single cause (p.56). The 1973-82 
period witnessed exceptionally slower growth, less than even that 
seen during the Great Depression (1.55 vs. 2.09 percent annual-
ly) . (Table 8-1, p. 111). 
2.4 Among the conclusions drawn from the above are: 
o Data indicates that the 1981 tax cuts exerted a significant 
impact on the federal deficit and may have played a major 
role in recent demand-side job stimulation, but that deficit 
spending cannot account for the Job creation record of the 
1970-1985 period as a whole. 
o Evidence suggests that, on balance, defense spending has had 
minimal, if any, impact on job creation. Several studies, 
for instance, conclude that defense budget increases and 
non-defense budget cuts have cancelled each other out. 
o Available-evidence suggests that increases in human capital 
do in fact play a major role in economic growth. 
­ 27 ­
III. Entrepreneurship Policy 
As the review in Part II indicates, no one public policy action 
seems to come even close to explaining the U.S. job creation 
experience in the last fourteen years. Some would argue, in 
fact, that it is a lack of public intervention — for example, in 
our labor markets — which explains our performance relative to 
Euorpe. Based on our work as a consultant on economic develop­
ment policy here in the United States, however, we do not support 
this contention. We accept that labor market inflexibility, could 
be one factor in Europe's lack of job growth, but do not accept 
that a relative lack of it satisfactorily explains the U.S.'s 
ability to innovate and adapt quickly within the changing world 
economy. 
A far more important variable, we believe, is the cultural and 
economic environment for entrepreneurship in the U.S. Public 
policies affect this environment, but do not create it from thin 
air. Moreover, the most sophisticated public efforts to promote 
entrepreneurship here are much less concerned with "minimalist 
government" policies such as deregulation, as with strategic 
interventions to provide potential entrepreneurs access to 
needed inputs otherwise unavailable to them; for example, 
specific types of capital or links to the latest technological 
breakthroughs. In the U.S., such policies are developing 
primarily at the state and local level. Lessons from the U.S. 
experience follow below. 
3.1 Research on the Economic Contribution of Enterpreneurship 
The subject of entrepreneurship and economic development has 
been a recurring but not well elaborated theme in the history of 
economic thought. Visions of the role of the entrepreneur can 
be traced at least as far back as I8OO when J.B. Say stated, 
■The entrepreneur shifts resources out of an area of lower and 
i'.ìttj an area of higher productivity and greater yield." 
However, it is only since the days of Joseph Schumpeter that 
economists have seen the entrepreneur as the key figure in the 
process of economic development. According to Schumpeter, the 
entrepreneur plays the role of disrupting the existing equili­
brium and thus contributing to economic growth through innova­
tion. This innovation assumes a variety of forms, including the 
invention of a new product with which consumers are not yet 
familiar; the discovery of a new method of production; the 
creation of new markets; the finding of new sources of raw 
materials; and the reorganization of entire industries. 
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3.1.1 Entrepreneurship and Job Creation 
The most notable aspect of the U.S. job experience is its 
dynamism. Research by Birch and Harris, for example, found 
that practically all of the variation in net employment changes 
among regions is due to differences in the rate of job replace-
ment .1 Birch, for instance, found that firm deaths and 
contractions vary little from one place to another; the key 
difference between growing and declining regions is their job 
replacement rate. Harris discovered that the regions experi-
encing better than average net employment growth actually have 
higher rates of gross job loss. Thus, between 1976 and 1980, 
the Pacific region was found to have lost 41 percent of its 1976 
workforce; however, the number of replacement jobs were 70 
percent greater than the number lost to plant closings, causing 
the region to experience substantially better than average net 
employment growth. 
Research by Armington and Odie finds that each percentage point 
of net employment growth in the aggregate is the net combination 
of 1.1 percent growth due to births, 1.7 percent due to expan-
sion, 1 percent loss due to deaths, and .8 percent loss due to 
contractions. These researchers find that between 1978 and 
198O, private sector employment increased by 8.3 percent, with 
the excess of ..expansion over contraction accounting for 59 
percent of this growth and the surplus of births over deaths 
accounting for the remaining 41 percent. (Armington and Odie — 
also of Brookings — "Sources of Employment Growth," 1978-1980; 
paper prepared for the Second Annual Small Business Research 
Conference; Bentley College, Walthara, Massachusetts; March 
11-12, 1982; pp. 5-6.) 
Furthermore, these same researchers have discovered that 
slightly more than 50 percent of all new jobs between 1969 and 
1980 were created by independent small entrepreneurs. This 
figure far exceeds such employers' 37 percent share of total 
job3. Maw and young establishments are also responsible for a 
majority of jobs created, a fact that applies to all facilities, 
whether independent, subsidiaries, or branch plants. 
Brookings also discovered that small independent concerns 
generated two hundred sixty-four percent of net employment 
change in the I98O-I982 period. 
The surprisingly large role of young firms in job creation is 
also reflected in a detailed case study of the electronics 
industry. The American Electronics Association surveyed its 
1 David L. Birch, The Job Generation Process; MIT Program on 
Neighborhood and Regional Change; Cambridge, Massachusetts; 1979; 
Candee S. Harris, "The Magnitude of Job Loss from Plant Closings 
and the Generation of Replacement Jobs: Some Recent Evidence;" 
Brookings Institution, September 1984. 
- 29 -
member corporations to measure the growth rate of firms in four 
different age categories: mature (more than 20 years old), 
teenage (between 10 and 20 years old), and developing (5 to 10 
years old), and start-ups (less than 5 years old). For 1976, 
the survey found that the average employment growth rate for the 
teenage companies was from 20 to 40 times the rate for mature 
companies. Developing companies had an employment growth rate 
in 1976 that was nearly 55 times the growth rate for mature com-
panies. The growth rate for start-ups in 1976 was 115 times 
that of mature companies. 
The importance of start-ups in generating jobs has also been 
noted in several other studies (Deloitte, Haskins and Sells; and 
Arthur D. Little, "Summary of the Economic Impact of the Small 
Business Investment Company Program;" Washington, DC: National 
Association of Small Business Investment Companies; 1982; 
American Electronics Association, Statement Before the House 
Committee on Ways and Means; March 7, 1978). The Haskins, 
Sells, and Little study found that companies financed by Small 
Business Investment Companies (SBICs) generated more than ten 
times the employment growth rate of all other small companies. 
Significantly, roughly one-third of the SBIC investments were 
directed to start-ups. Another study, by U.S. General Ac-
counting Office (GAO), points out that $209 million in venture 
capital* investments in the 1970s created 130,000 jobs, more 
than $100 million in corporate tax revenues, $350 million in 
employee tax revenues, and $900 million in export sales. (GAO 
Report GAO/82-35, Washington, DC: I982.) 
3.1.2 Entrepreneurship and Innovation 
U.S. small businesses also play a critical role in new technolog-
ical innovation. The U.S. Department of Commerce concluded in a 
1967 study, Technological Innovation: Its Environment and 
Management, that more than 50 percent of all scientific and 
technological developments since the beginning of the century 
could be directly attributed to the efforts of small businesses 
and independent inventors. Small firms and independent in-
ventors not only are the main source of innovation, however; 
they also seem to innovate more efficiently and at a lower cost 
than larger firms. The National Science Foundation has reported 
that, from 1953 to 1973, small enterprises produced 4 times as 
many innovations per research and development dollar as 
medium-sized firms, and 24 times as many as large businesses. 
A more recent GAO investigation reviews nine major empirical 
studies on this issue, concluding that smaller firms contribute 
mightily to industrial innovation. (GAO, Report PAD-82-18, 
Washington, DC: 1982.) Their innovative efficiency appears to 
be higher than that of large firms. Small enterprises also are 
the most likely contributors to new product development in 
atomistic industries, while in concentrated industries, they 
play a more complementary role, performing specialized functions 
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and developing products which bigger business then dominates. 
Finally, some data indicate that small businesses are better at 
creating new technically feasible ideas than they are at 
commercializing them. This may, however, partially reflect the 
capital and other market barriers that small and new and young 
firms face in the business world. 
Small firms thus tend to innovate in a different manner than big 
business: They tend to create new products and processes, 
establishing new markets and hence new jobs. Large-firm innova-
tion, by comparison, is directed more at improving efficiencies 
in production processes and substituting capital for expensive 
labor, in order to undercut the competition and increase the 
firms' share of an existing market. Small firms create markets 
and jobs; large firms often reduce the need for labor in 
existing markets — ideally, freeing resources for new invest-
ment. Other studies suggest that entrepreneurial companies tend 
to produce more break-through innovations, while established 
companies stick to incremental improvements. 
3.1.3 Entrepreneurship and Economic Resilience 
Continuing economic health depends upon the economic vitality 
represented by a high rate of company formations. 
"What we really want," business professor Albert Shapero 
notes, "is to achieve a state denoted by resilience — the 
ability to respond to changes in the environment effec-
tively; creativity and innovativeness — the ability and 
willingness to experiment and innovate; initiative taking 
— the desire and power to begin to carry through useful 
projects. Preceding and accompanying these dynamic charac-
teristics .. .is diversity. Obviously, diversity offers an 
area some measures of invulnerability of the effects of 
many unforeseen events and decisions; unaffected by changes 
in a single industry or market place or legal constraints 
on a given product. Less obvious, but perhaps as im-
portant, diversity provides a favorable environment for 
creativity and innovativeness." 
Smaller, more entrepreneurial firms play a crucial role in 
providing these desired economic characteristics. 
3.1.4 Small Business and Job Quality 
The quality of small business employment is, of course, a 
controversial topic of debate. Evidence exists that they tend, 
on average, to create fewer "good" jobs — they pay less, 
provide less employment security, have poorer working condi-
tions, and do not provide benefits. This does not always hold 
true, however; during the 198O—1982 recession, for example, an 
American manufacturing worker was more apt to lose his or her 
job in a large firm — over 100 employees — than in a small 
- 31 -
one.2 Moreover, one additional service that small firms do 
provide is first time employment to new members of the labor 
market. Evidence exists that these new labor market entrants 
then use the training or simple work skills learned in the small 
firm sector to move up to higher paid jobs with larger firms. 
(See Roger Vaughan, State Tax Policy and the Development of 
Small and New Business, Coalition of Northeastern Governors, 
Policy Research Center, 1983 · ) 
3.2 Public Policy Supports for Entrepreneurship3 
During the last ten years — largely in response to the data 
presented above — there has been a revolution in U.S. state and 
local economic development policy. In that short period of time 
the focus of development efforts has shifted from luring branch 
plants of large manufacturing firms — affectionately known as 
"smokestack chasing" -- to cultivating in-state entrepreneurs 
and businesses. 
Crosscutting the wide body of experimentation in this field is a 
consistent set of themes. The new policies and programs possess 
the following features: 
o Investment Oriented: They are premised on the idea that we 
must invest resources now in order to gain growth, health 
and increased returns later. The assumption of risk is 
inherent in this process. 
o People Centered: The policies recognize that the central 
dynamic in a changing economy is people with ideas about 
how to do something better. 
o Market Perfecting: The policies recognize both the effec­
tiveness and power of private markets, as well as their 
shortcomings. The policies aim at improving market func-
cionii.g, focusing on areas where there are identifiable 
market failures. 
o Public-Private Cooperation: The policies comprehend that we 
live in one economy — part private and part public. The 
role of the public sector is neither simply to "get out of 
the way" nor to respond with bureaucratic programs; 
instead, it is to help perfect markets and to act as an 
entrepreneur as well. 
Harris Candee, "The Magnitude of Job Loss from Plant Closings and 
the Generation of Replacement Jobs: Some Recent Evidence," The 
Annals of the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science^ September 1984 ; ρ . 15. 
A comprehensive guide to the theory and practice of U.S. 
entrepreneurship policy at the state and local level can be found 
in the Corporation for Enterprise Development's Building the New 
Economy: States in the Lead (Washington, DC: CfED"" 1906°) 
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o Cross-Political Lines : The policies are pursued by both 
Democratic and Republican governors, and attract and repel 
constituencies across the political spectrum. They are 
neither "laissez-faire" conservatism nor welfare-state 
liberalism. 
o Bridge Economic and Social Policies: The policies recognize 
that social problems need economic solutions and that the 
key to a revitalized economy is to bring new people and 
products to the marketplace. 
Abundant theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that 
markets — like all other human institutions — do not function 
perfectly. Investment does not always flow to areas of highest 
return (controlling for risk). "Seed" and equity capital 
investment is often unavailable to new, young and growing 
businesses. Investable assets are becoming increasingly con-
centrated in large institutions which find it difficult and 
costly to make long-term investments in small deals, and are by 
habit and regulation trained to be excessively risk averse. 
Labor markets are similarly imperfect: information on job 
openings and available skilled labor is fragmented and expen-
sive; financing for the acquisition of new skills is often 
unavailable, even as skill requirements increase and change with 
greater rapidity; rewards for skill acquisition are often 
uncertain and low in a loose labor market; management practices 
and the threat of technological displacement often inhibit labor 
productivity. Technological innovation is impeded by lack of 
investment in R&D and new ventures, research biases of engineers 
and scientists, and gaps between academia and the marketplace. 
Market imperfections differ from region to region. For in-
stance, states that already possess an abundance of venture 
capital will proceed very differently from those that have none. 
Thus ; programmatic success will come only after a careful look 
at the critical ingredients of business formation, expansion, 
and renewal in a state — capital, labor, markets, technology, 
and management — and a thoughtful crafting of well-targeted 
efforts to reduce or abolish these barriers. 
e 
e 
It should be noted, too, that these systemic barriers also 
represent opportunities: if they can be lowered or removed, th 
opportunity for a widespread increase in business growth will b_ 
created, along with the associated gains in employment, innova-
tion, and economic vitality. Careful identification and assess-
ment of the barriers are critically important, for the effec-
tiveness of any public policy initiative to stimulate entrepre-
neurship depends on the significance of the barrier addressed 
and appropriateness of the remedy. 
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3.2.1 Guidelines of an Effective Entrepreneurial Policy 
The most effective of these new policies share the following 
five characteristics: (1) They are carefully aimed at the 
barriers to entry and expansion faced by new, young and growing 
enterprises. The needs of those businesses are distinct: they 
need equity not debt, and they cannot take advantage of business 
tax incentives. (2) They are indirect and systemic since it is 
impossible for the public sector to cut individual deals with 
hundreds of thousands of fledgling entrepreneurs. (3) They are 
cheap and rely either on redirecting existing public expendi-
tures or private capital flows. These conditions are dictated 
both by the magnitude of the resources required, current 
constrictions on state budgets, and the absolute necessity of 
conserving and increasing public investments in education and 
services that are crucial to cultivating a self-sufficient 
population. (4) They are market-sensitive, designed to engage 
the energies and initiative of a large number of people and 
institutions but without pretending markets are perfect. (5) 
They address the full range of public policy from income-
maintenance and social-service policies to employment and 
economic policies. 
Entrepreneurship policies must not be guided by popular mytholo-
gies regarding public and private capacities. Private is not 
always efficient and public is not always wasteful and le-
thargic. Nor are public and private sectors separate and 
independent. In fact, thinking about them in that way prevents 
market-perfecting strategies which could expand output and jobs, 
and confines public economic activities to bureaucratic and 
marginal activities. We live in a single economy, partly public 
and partly private, where the real question is how can the 
sectors most productively interact to optimize the achievement 
of public and private values. 
Properly designed development programs should be viewed not as 
mere expenditures of taxpayer dollars, but as investments in the 
citizenry's future prosperity. The state government should be 
investing in new ideas through its research and development 
efforts; in its people through its education and training 
programs; in its businesses by increasing access to capital; in 
public works by assessing the infrastructure needs for an 
evolving economy and by putting a long-term capital planning and 
budgeting process in place; and in its natural resources through 
its efforts to insure the sustained productivity of renewable 
resources while securing a healthy environment. 
Entrepreneurial policy also requires a genuine belief in the ingenuity of working people. There is no way of assuring this except by making sure reasonable access to the necessary support and investments exists. 
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3.2.2 Michigan: A Case In Point 
Governor James Blanchard of Michigan presides over one of the 
states most hard hit by the last recession and by global 
industrial restructuring. By necessity and by creativity his 
administration has pushed the boundaries of policy innovation 
into new areas, thereby laying the building blocks for creating 
one of the most comprehensive and forward-looking of all the 
state strategies. 
Early on, facing tight budgeting constraints, the Blanchard 
administration realized that it must carefully and strategically 
target its limited state resources of money, expertise, and · 
people. The Governor asked his Cabinet Council on Jobs and 
Economic Development to devise new ways to meet the economic 
needs "of industries in which Michigan has an historic competi­
tive advantage: industries which comprise a major portion of 
our economic base and are important to the development, expan­
sion, and diversification of that base." 
Doug Ross, now the state's Commerce Director, was charged with 
convening a high level group of policymakers and policy analysts 
to define that competitive strength. Its report, The Path to 
Prosperity, found that 
"The state remains one of the leading centers of durable 
goods manufacturing in the world. We possess some of the 
largest manufacturing firms in the world in a variety of 
industries, including automobiles, steel, machinery, office 
equipment, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, appliances, and 
office furniture. Our management and labor skills are 
concentrated in manufacturing to a degree perhaps greater 
than any other state in the nation. We have a vast in­
dustrial infrastructure, highways, railroads, airports, 
water and related resources, physical plant, equipment, 
labor — created expressly to support manufacturing. We 
have α broad network of suppliers and ancillary industries 
already in place to serve our manufacturing economy. Our 
universities are strong in industrial technology. Michi­
gan's fundamental problem is that we no longer employ these 
resources in the most competitive and innovative way to 
produce the most competitive products." 
Michigan's new industrial frontier lies in applying new technolo­
gy to its existing economic base and becoming the "factory of 
the future." 
The Blanchard Administration has sought to do this by under­
taking a variety of new initiatives. First, it made direct 
investments in public-private-academic programs to foster the 
development and commercial application of new technologies. The 
new administration built on the previous Governor's High 
Technology Task Force work and provided financing for: (1) the 
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Industrial Technology Institute (ITI) which was designed to 
encourage advanced industrial automation; and (2) the Michigan 
Biotechnology Institute (MBI) to spearhead new research in 
molecular biology. Both of these "centers of excellence" fit in 
well with Michigan's comparative advantage and were infant 
industries nationwide. ITI, for instance, plans to run a three 
track strategy. Track one, which will tap half of ITI's re-
sources, are short-term development projects that can be commer-
cialized in one to three years. Eventually this will be financed 
almost entirely by industry on a contractual basis. The next 25 
percent of its activities will be in applied research, such as 
building feasibility demonstrations and prototypes, and will tap 
both private and government dollars. The third track would' 
involve more basic research in the robotics field. 
Next, the state developed a targeted industry development 
program for auto supplies, forest products, and food processing. 
Each of the three targets presented clear, compelling and unique 
opportunities for job growth or retention. However, the state 
does not provide any set-asides or special incentives for any of 
these sectors. Instead, it seeks to create public/industry 
councils for strategic thinking and cooperation, to conduct 
up-to-date research on each industry, to better coordinate and 
package existing development incentives for projects in target 
industries, to.bridge "turf" problems between different state 
agencies, to encourage new technology adoption, and to develop 
computerized data bases of industries, products and customers. 
The administration also sought to grapple with the underdevelop-
ment of the venture capital industry in the state — only $35 
million was invested in the state during 1982, compared to $718 
million in Massachusetts and nearly $1.3 billion in California. 
The legislature passed a law in 1982 which earmarked up to 5 
percent of public employee retirement fund benefits for such 
investments. The new fund was launched in 1983 and by March 
1985 it had directly invested $40 million and committed another 
$78 .ail lim* to limited partnerships with other in-state and 
out-of-state professional venture capital funds. 
The state recognized that this venture capital effort to help 
foster indigenous business development, expansion, and retention 
would not realize its fullest potential if entreprenuers' other 
financing programs were too uncoordinated and limited in scope 
to provide full life cycle financing options. The Michigan 
Strategic Fund (MSF) was created to meet this need, to combine 
its existing programs under one umbrella, and to create some new 
institutions. The MSF has broad ranging powers to obtain and 
invest funds and consists of six development "windows": (1) the 
Center for Product Development; (2) the Center for Loan In-
surance; (3) the Center for Assistance to Private Enterprise; 
(4) the Center for Research and Development; (5) the Center for 
Assistance to Local Government; (6) the Center for Minority 
Venture Capital. Some of the centers are still taking shape, 
- 36 -
but the first two are now being implemented. The product 
development institution will finance new processes, technolo-
gies, and products that can be commercially developed by 
providing a small matching grant and getting a royalty on future 
sales. The state is now marketing a "loan loss reserve" program 
to Michigan banks that would be an actuarily-based loan in-
surance pool, equally financed by lender, borrower, and govern-
ment. Its purpose would be to encourage higher risk bank 
investments by providing a sufficient margin of funds to cover 
worst case loan loss scenarios. 
MSF's design offers the advantages of flexibility, comprehensive 
private sector participation in its deals (through its board of 
directors) and clear targetting to the state's strongest opportuni-
ies. 
Finally, the Blanchard Administration did not neglect tradi-
tional "business climate" issues. It created a computerized 
ombudsman service and cut out nearly one-third of the required 
state forms needed to do business. Securities regulations were 
streamlined. The state reformed its archaic franchise laws, 
overhauled its workers compensation program, and cut taxes for 
smaller firms. It created various business commissions in order 
to better listen to the private sector and develop new policy on 
the basis of an enhanced dialogue between the public and private 
sectors. 
3.2.3 Life Cycle Support for Entrepreneurship in the U.S. 
What follows is a stage by stage breakdown of the environmental 
inputs needed to support entrepreneurial activity. To the 
extent these inputs exist — as they largely do in the U.S. — 
the result is a healthy environment for entrepreneurship. To 
the extent they are lacking, barriers to entrepreneurship will 
result. 
? "· 3.1 F. 1; Medels: Researchers estimate that five to ten 
percent of any population possesses latent entrepreneurial 
talent. A far smaller percentage, however, learn to realize 
that potential. The presence or lack of role models with whom 
the potential entrepreneur can identify is one critical variable 
in determining who does and does not take the entrepreneurial 
path. 
Obviously, the U.S. has a major advantage here in that, aside 
from the small number of highly publicized, big stakes entrepre-
neurs, over 9 million Americans are currently self-employed. 
Furthermore, we have 3·1 million business owners who provide 
important role models for our fastest growing entrepreneurial 
sector: the woman-owned business. Women-owned sole proprietor-
ships now account for one quarter of all U.S. sole proprietor-
ships, and their numbers are increasing faster every year. 
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3.2.3.2 Cultural Support: The cultural differences between 
Europe and the U.S. regarding entrepreneurship are striking. In 
the U.S., the entrepreneur is hallowed as hero. In parts of 
Europe, one gets the impression that while competence is 
admired, people who earn a huge sura of money from business 
activities must apologize for it when conversing with their 
friends and colleagues. 
Sensible risk taking is another ideal in the U.S. A person who 
takes well-balanced risks is admired here. If one starts a 
business and it fails, that person will pick him or herself up 
and start another one. In many venture capital circles here, a 
person is taken more seriously if he has already suffered 
through at least one business failure. The assumption is that 
we learn from failure, and that if a person has never 
experienced a failure, he will be less likely to recognize the 
signs of a new one in the making. 
In parts of Europe, a business failure is regarded on a level 
with the plague. In the words of one German businessman, 
referring to why his country had such difficulty luring poten-
tial entrepreneurs from existing corporations, "If someone who 
left failed, he'd be virtually unemployable by a large corpora-
tion." Or, in the words of a Swiss banker, "In the States, if 
someone·loses $10 million, it's considered money spent to 
acquire an education for his next venture. Here, you have to 
change your name, you have to move. You can never get funding. 
Forget it." (Both quoted in "Europe Inc.," Inc. Magazine 
September 1985.) 
3.2.3.3 Access to New Technology or Research: Entrepreneurs in 
some industries require access to new technological 
developments. Here in the U.S., there are a variety of efforts, 
generally initiated by state governments, to improve linkages 
between the private sector and the research activities of major 
universities. Some state programs also provide capital to 
support, more market oriented research to help bridge the gap 
from basic R&D to actual product development. 
3.2.3.4 Access to Information: In a rapidly changing world, 
marl'et opportunities appear and are then absorbed by whomever 
gets there first. To discern these opportunities, one needs 
access to information. An often overlooked form of public 
assistance to American entrepreneurs is the huge quantity and 
quality of data gathered, compiled and published by the U.S. 
government. Such data is generally free for the asking and 
covers'such ground as the changing demographics and income of 
the consumer and business market and regional differences in the 
educational attainment of the workforce. 
3.2.3.5 Seeu Capital: Once a potential entrepreneur has decided 
to 'ake the plunge and has identified a niche he or she thinks 
can be filled, the next step is to find money to finance the 
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early start-up or pre-start-up stage of the venture. Such 
financing precedes by a large gap the "venture capital" 
financing one normally associates with entrepreneurship. In the 
U.S., admittedly a rich nation, seed capital is usually provided 
by friends, family, associates — the FFA network. Combined 
with other informal (i.e., non-institutional) financing sources, 
the FFA provides a fairly adequate pool of early stage, high 
risk capital for most communities in the U.S. Seed capital is 
conspicuously scarce in low-income communities in the U.S., 
however, and for this reason many states and non-profit de-
velopers are experimenting with public seed capital funds in 
such communities. 
3.2.3.6 Risk and Venture Capital: The U.S. venture capital 
market, though somewhat small relative to the need and perhaps 
overly concentrated in a few industries, is nonetheless the most 
developed in the world. The U.S. banking system, though con-
servative in its lending, also provides a vital source of funds 
to the small business sector. Relative to Europe, the most 
salient aspect of both these capital sources is their extreme 
degree of decentralization. We have, for example, 1,400 
separate banks with 40,000 separate branches. The result is a 
fully competitive, aggressive market of both sellers and pur-
chasers of capital. 
3.2.3.7 Access to Large and Diverse Markets: The larger and 
more diverse the market an entrepreneur has access to, the 
greater will be his or her opportunity for success. In the 
U.S., entrepreneurs have access — for both buying and selling 
— to an enormous yet well linked domestic market. In Europe, 
by comparison, many small businesses must quickly enter the 
export market in order to expand — an added and sometimes 
conclusive obstacle to the many difficulties of starting up a 
new business venture. 
3.2.3.8 Supportive Public Policy: To the extent that public 
pili..j d,nances the environmental supports listed above, it will 
contribute to the entrepreneurial dynamism of the economy. By 
treating all gaps in the above list of prerequisite supports as 
specific carriers to be overcome, policy can be crafted to 
achieve the maximum effect with the least public expenditure (or 
undesired market distortion). In the U.S., a tremendous surge 
in state and local activity has recently arisen to reduce market 
barriers to entrepreneurship. Many of these programs purport to 
help small business meet the criteria discussed above; however, 
others simply seem to throw money at smaller firms in a vague 
hope that greater job creation will result. Thus it is critical 
to note that small business promotion is not necessarily an 
economic development tool; to be an effective tool of develop-
ment, such programs must have a more strategic sense of what 
they hope to accomplish. (We should also note that the surge in 
public sector support for entrepreneurship here was a reaction 
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to a pre-existing surge in entrepreneurship, and therefore 
cannot easily explain the U.S. job creation experience over the 
past fifteen years.) 
3.3 Conclusion 
o High levels of entrepreneurship in the U.S. are one 
explanation of the recent U.S. job creation experience. 
o The entrepreneur's role in economic development is to 
disturb an existing equilibrium — or take advantage of 
exogenous disturbances or dislocations — in order to 
exploit untapped opportunities for profit making. In doing 
so, the entrepreneur creates new products or services, or 
delivers old ones in a more efficient or qualitative 
manner, and thus innovates to develop markets and 
economies. 
o Entrepreneurs are not produced from thin air. The presence 
or absence of a variety of environmental supports greatly 
influences the level of entrepreneurial activity in an 
area. The absence of any of these supports is thus a 
barrier to entrepreneurship. 
o Public policy on entrepreneurship will be effective to the 
extent it enhances these supports (or reduces these barri-
ers) . A pure laissez-faire approach will therefore miss 
much of the potential for governments to strategically 
nurture the desired supports. By the same token, unstrate-
gic government expenditures designed to "help small busi-
ness" will also miss their potential. 
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CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE (THOUSANDS) 
APPROXIMATING U.S. CONCEPTS 
1959 
1960 
196 1 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
68,369 
69,628 
70,459 
70,614 
71,833 
73,091 
74,455 
75,770 
77,347 
78,737 
80,734 
82,771 
84,382 
87,034 
89,429 
91,949 
93,775 
96,158 
99,009 
102,251 
104,962 
106,940 
108,670 
110,204 
111,550 
113,544 
6,286 
6,462 
6,575 
6,670 
6,805 
6,994 
7,207 
7,493 
7,747 
7,951 
8, 194 
8,395 
8,639 
8,897 
9,276 
9,639 
9,974 
10,203 
10,500 
10,895 
11,231 
11,573 
11,904 
11,958 
12, 183 
12,399 
(2) 
(2) 
(2) 
(2) 
(2) 
4,559 
4,689 
4,862 
5,022 
5, 140 
5,284 
5,478 
5,624 
5,752 
5,901 
6,053 
6, 169 
6,244 
6,358 
6,443 
6,519 
6,693 
6,810 
6,910 
6,997 
7,133 
43,320 
44,120 
44,610 
45,040 
45,430 
46.040 
46,780 
47,850 
48,810 
49,690 
50,140 
50,730 
51, 120 
51,320 
52,590 
52,440 
52,530 
53,100 
53,820 
54,610 
55,210 
55,740 
56,320 
56,980 
58, 110 
58,480 
18,960 
18,970 
18,940 
19,080 
19,280 
19,650 
19,750 
20,010 
20,110 
20,360 
20,770 
20,800 
20,980 
21,120 
21,360 
21,550 
21,600 
21,840 
22,100 
22,290 
22,470 
22,570 
22,640 
22,900 
22,800 
(3)22,990 
25,850 
25,990 
26,160 
26,210 
26,290 
26,270 
26,380 
26,290 
25,730 
25,690 
25,960 
26,240 
26,420 
26,340 
26,540 
26,400 
26,130 
25,900 
25,870 
26,000 
26,240 
26,500 
26,610 
26,640 
26,640 
(3)26,700 
23,330 
23,550 
23,810 
24,150 
24,360 
24,490 
24,650 
24,740 
24,710 
24,600 
24,580 
24,510 
24,360 
24,600 
24,850 
24,880 
25,130 
25,290 
25,430 
25,620 
25,710 
25,870 
25,870 
(3)25,880 
(3)25,980 
(3)26,390 
20,900 
20,730 
20,750 
20,610 
20,190 
20,160 
19,810 
19,540 
19,710 
19,700 
19,530 
19,650 
19,580 
19,380 
19,550 
19,890 
20,080 
20,300 
20,530 
20,630 
20,910 
21,210 
21,410 
21,450 
21,610 
(3)21,600 
4 
4; 
4 
4 
4 
5. 
5, 
5, 
5, 
(3)5, 
(3)5, 
(3)5, 
(2) 
(2) 
(2) 
(2) 
(2) 
(2) 
(2) 
(2) 
(2) 
(2) 
(2) 
(2) 
(2) 
(2) 
,710 
,770 
,820 
,890 
,950 
,010 
,100 
,290 
,500 
,560 
,720 
,740 
3,609 
3,679 
3,695 
3,718 
3,724 
3,719 
3,743 
3,794 
3,772 
3,822 
3,851 
3,909 
3,955 
3,964 
3,971 
4,037 
4, 123 
4, 149 
4, 168 
4,203 
4,262 
4,312 
4,326 
4,350 
4,369 
4,385 
CONTINUED ON THE FOLLOWING PAGE. 
SUPPLEMENT TO TABLE 3 . LABOR FORCE, EMPLOYMENT, AND UNEMPLOYMENT I N TEN COUNTRIES, 1959-84—CONTINUED 
UNITED GREAT NETHER-
YEAR STATES CANADA AUSTRALIA JAPAN FRANCE GERMANY BRITAIN ITALY LANDS SWEDEN 
( 4 ) ( 1 ) 
C IV IL IAN EMPLOYMENT (THOUSANDS) 
ft« 
APPROXIMATING U.S . CONCEPTS 
1959 
1960 
196 1 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
197 1 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
6 4 , 6 3 0 
65 ,778 
65 ,746 
6 6 , 7 0 2 
6 7 , 7 6 2 
6 9 , 3 0 5 
7 1 , 0 8 8 
7 2 , 8 9 5 
7 4 , 3 7 2 
7 5 , 9 2 0 
7 7 , 9 0 2 
7 8 , 6 7 8 
79 ,367 
8 2 , 153 
8 5 , 0 6 4 
8 6 , 7 9 4 
85 ,846 
8 8 , 7 5 2 
92 ,017 
96 ,048 
98 ,824 
9 9 , 3 0 3 
100,397 
99 ,526 
100,834 
105,005 
5 ,936 
6 , 0 4 2 
6 , 136 
6 , 3 0 2 
6 ,454 
6 ,688 
6 ,944 
7 , 2 4 2 
7 , 4 5 1 
7 , 5 9 3 
7 , 8 3 2 
7 , 9 1 9 
8 , 104 
8 ,344 
8 , 7 6 1 
9 , 125 
9 ,284 
9 ,477 
9 , 6 5 1 
9 ,987 
10,395 
10,708 
11,006 
10,644 
10,734 
11,000 
( 2 ) 
( 2 ) 
( 2 ) 
( 2 ) 
( 2 ) 
4 ,496 
4 ,628 
4 , 7 8 5 
4 ,928 
5 ,046 
5 ,188 
5 ,388 
5 ,517 
5 , 6 0 1 
5 ,765 
5 , 8 9 1 
5 ,866 
5 ,946 
6 , 0 0 0 
6 ,038 
6 , 1 1 1 
6 ,284 
6 ,416 
6 , 4 1 5 
6 , 3 0 0 
6 , 4 9 0 
4 2 , 3 4 0 
4 3 , 3 7 0 
4 3 , 9 5 0 
4 4 , 4 5 0 
4 4 , 8 4 0 
4 5 , 5 0 0 
4 6 , 2 1 0 
4 7 , 2 0 0 
4 8 , 180 
4 9 , 1 0 0 
4 9 , 5 7 0 
5 0 , 140 
5 0 , 4 8 0 
5 0 , 5 9 0 
5 1 , 9 1 0 
5 1 , 7 1 0 
5 1 , 5 3 0 
5 2 , 0 2 0 
5 2 , 7 2 0 
5 3 , 3 7 0 
5 4 , 0 4 0 
5 4 , 6 0 0 
5 5 , 0 6 0 
5 5 , 6 2 0 
5 6 , 5 5 0 
5 6 , 8 7 0 
18 ,630 
18 ,670 
18 ,680 
18 ,830 
19,040 
19,390 
19 ,470 
19,660 
19 ,740 
19 ,870 
2 0 , 3 1 0 
2 0 , 2 9 0 
2 0 , 4 1 0 
2 0 , 5 3 0 
2 0 , 7 9 0 
2 0 , 9 4 0 
2 0 , 7 0 0 
2 0 , 8 5 0 
2 1 , 0 3 0 
2 1 , 110 
2 1 , 110 
2 1 , 1 2 0 
2 0 , 9 5 0 
2 0 , 9 8 0 
2 0 , 8 4 0 
( 3 ) 2 0 , 6 7 0 
2 5 , 3 4 0 
2 5 , 7 1 0 
2 6 , 0 0 0 
2 6 , 0 6 0 
2 6 , 1 7 0 
2 6 , 1 7 0 
2 6 , 3 1 0 
2 6 , 2 2 0 
2 5 , 3 9 0 
2 5 , 4 0 0 
2 5 , 7 9 0 
2 6 , 100 
2 6 , 2 6 0 
2 6 , 1 5 0 
2 6 , 3 5 0 
2 5 , 9 8 0 
2 5 , 2 3 0 
2 5 , 0 1 0 
2 4 , 9 7 0 
2 5 , 1 3 0 
2 5 , 4 6 0 
2 5 , 7 3 0 
2 5 , 5 2 0 
2 5 , 0 6 0 
2 4 , 6 5 0 
( 3 ) 2 4 , 6 1 0 
2 2 , 6 9 0 
2 3 , 0 7 0 
2 3 , 3 8 0 
2 3 , 5 3 0 
2 3 , 5 9 0 
2 3 , 9 2 0 
2 4 , 1 6 0 
2 4 , 2 2 0 
2 3 , 9 4 0 
2 3 , 8 4 0 
2 3 , 8 6 0 
2 3 , 7 8 0 
2 3 , 4 3 0 
2 3 , 5 8 0 
2 4 , 0 7 0 
2 4 , 1 3 0 
2 4 , 0 0 0 
2 3 , 8 1 0 
2 3 , 8 4 0 
2 4 , 0 4 0 
2 4 , 3 6 0 
2 4 , 1 0 0 
2 3 , 190 
( 3 ) 2 2 , 8 2 0 
( 3 ) 2 2 , 6 5 0 
( 3 ) 2 2 , 9 6 0 
2 0 , 0 2 0 
2 0 , 0 6 0 
2 0 , 1 6 0 
2 0 , 1 0 0 
19 ,760 
19,680 
19 ,210 
18 ,890 
19 ,130 
19 ,080 
18 ,940 
19 ,080 
19 ,020 
18 ,730 
18 ,910 
19 ,350 
19 ,480 
19 ,600 
19 ,800 
19,870 
2 0 , 1 0 0 
2 0 , 3 8 0 
2 0 , 4 8 0 
2 0 , 4 3 0 
2 0 , 4 7 0 
( 3 ) 2 0 , 4 0 0 
4 
4, 
4, 
4 
4, 
4, 
4, 
4, 
4, 
( 3 ) 4 , 
( 3 ) 4 , 
( 3 ) 4 
( 2 ) 
( 2 ) 
( 2 ) 
( 2 ) 
( 2 ) 
( 2 ) 
( 2 ) 
( 2 ) 
( 2 ) 
( 2 ) 
( 2 ) 
( 2 ) 
( 2 ) 
( 2 ) 
,560 
,590 
,570 
,630 
,700 
,750 
,830 
,960 
,990 
,930 
,890 
,880 
3 ,549 
3 ,616 
3 ,640 
3 ,663 
3 , 6 6 2 
3 , 6 6 1 
3 ,699 
3 ,735 
3 ,692 
3 ,737 
3 ,778 
3 ,850 
3 ,854 
3 ,857 
3 ,873 
3 ,956 
4 ,056 
4 , 0 8 3 
4 , 0 9 3 
4 , 109 
4 , 174 
4 ,226 
4 , 2 1 8 
4 , 2 1 3 
4 ,218 
4 , 2 4 9 
CONTINUED ON THE FOLLOWING PAGE. 
_!^_EMEÎ!I_T0_TA.!_!: 3: _* B 0L^ 0 RS E: EMPL0YMENT' AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN TEN COUNTRIES, 1959-84—CONTINUED 
UNITED GREAT NETHER-YEAR STATES CANADA AUSTRALIA JAPAN FRANCE GERMANY BRITAIN ITALY LANDS SWEDEN (1) (4) ( 1 ) 
.UNEMPLOYMENT (THOUSANDS) 
APPROXIMATING U.S. CONCEPTS 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
197 1 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
3 ,740 
3 ,852 
4 ,714 
3 ,911 
4 ,070 
3 ,786 
3 ,366 
2 ,875 
2 ,975 
2 ,817 
2 ,832 
4 , 0 9 3 
5 ,016 
4 , 8 8 2 
4 , 3 6 5 
5 , 156 
7 ,929 
7 ,406 
6 , 9 9 1 
6 , 2 0 2 
6 , 137 
7 ,637 
8 , 2 7 3 
10,678 
10,717 
8 , 5 3 9 
350 
420 
439 
368 
351 
306 
263 
251 
296 
358 
362 
476 
535 
553 
515 
514 
690 
726 
849 
908 
836 
865 
898 
1,314 
1,448 
1,399 
( 2 ) 
( 2 ) 
( 2 ) 
( 2 ) 
( 2 ) 
63 
61 
76 
94 
94 
96 
91 
107 
150 
136 
162 
302 
298 
358 
405 
408 
409 
394 
495 
697 
642 
980 
750 
660 
590 
590 
540 
570 
650 
630 
590 
570 
590 
640 
730 
680 
730 
1,000 
1,080 
1 , 100 
1,240 
1 , 170 
1 , 140 
1,260 
1,360 
1,560 
1,610 
330 
300 
26 0 
250 
240 
260 
280 
350 
370 
490 
460 
510 
570 
590 
57 0 
610 
900 
990 
1,070 
1 , 180 
1,360 
1,450 
1,690 
1,920 
1,960 
( 3 ) 2 , 3 2 0 
510 610 880 (2) 280 480 670 (2) 160 430 590 (2) 150 620 510 (2) 120 770 420 (2) 100 570 480 (2) 
70 490 600 (2) 70 520 640 (2) 340 770 590 (2) 290 760 610 (2) 170 720 600 (2) 
140 730 560 (2) 160 930 560 (2) 190 1,020 650 (2) 190 780 630 150 420 750 550 180 
890 1,130 610 250 890 1,480 700 260 900 1,590 740 250 870 1,580 760 260 780 1,350 810 270 
770 1,770 830 330 1,090 2,680 920 510 1,580 (3)3,060 1,020 (3)630 1,990 (3)3,330 1,140 (3)830 2,090 (3)3,430 (3)1,200 (3)860 
60 63 55 55 62 58 
44 59 80 85 73 
59 101 107 98 80 
67 66 75 94 88 
86 108 137 151 136 
CONTINUED ON THE FOLLOWING PAGE. 
SUPPLEMENT TO TABLE 3. LABOR FORCE, EMPLOYMENT, AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN TEN COUNTRIES, 1959-84—CONTINUED 
UNITED GREAT NETHER-YEAR STATES CANADA AUSTRALIA JAPAN FRANCE GERMANY BRITAIN ITALY LANDS SWEDEN (4) (1) 
CIVILIAN UNEMPLOYMENT RATE (PERCENT) 
APPROXIMATING U.S. CONCEPTS 
1959 
1960 
196 1 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
197 1 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
5.5 
5.5 
6.7 5.5 5.7 5.2 
4.5 
3.8 3.8 3.6 
3.5 
4.9 
5.9 5.6 4.9 5.6 
8.5 
7.7 
7. 1 
6. 1 
5.8 
7. 1 
7.6 
9.7 
9.6 7.5 
5.6 
6.5 
6.7 
5.5 
5.2 4.4 
3.6 
3.4 
3.8 4.5 
4.4 
5.7 
6.2 6.2 5.5 
5.3 
6.9 
7. 1 
8. 1 
8.3 
7.4 
7.5 
7.5 11.0 
11.9 
11.3 
(8)2. 1 
(8)1.6 
(8)3.0 
(8)2.9 
(8)2.3 1.4 
1.3 
1.6 1.9 1.8 1.8 
1.6 
1.9 
2.6 
2.3 2.7 
4.9 
4.8 5.6 
6.3 
6.3 
6. 1 
5.8 
7.2 
10.0 
9.0 
2.3 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.2 
1.2 
1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 
1.2 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.4 
1.9 
2.0 
2.0 
2.3 2.1 
2.0 2.2 2.4 2.7 
2.8 
1.7 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.3 
1.4 1.7 1.8 2.4 2.2 
2.5 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.8 
4.2 4.5 4.8 5.3 6. 1 
6.4 7.5 8.4 8.6 (3)10.1 
2.0 1. 1 .6 .6 .5 .4 
.3 .3 1.3 1.1 .6 
.5 .6 .7 .7 1.6 
3.4 3.4 3.5 3.4 3.0 
2.9 4.1 5.9 7.5 (3)7.8 
2.6 2.0 1.8 2.6 3.2 2.3 
2.0 2.1 3.1 3.1 2.9 
3.0 3.8 4.1 
3. 1 3.0 
4.5 5.9 
6.3 6.2 
5.3 
6.8 10.4 (3)11.8 (3)12.8 (3)13.0 
4.2 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.1 2.4 
3.0 3.3 3.0 3.1 3.1 
2.8 2.9 3.4 3.2 2.8 
3.0 3.4 3.6 3.7 3.9 
3.9 4.3 4.8 5.3 (3)5.6 
(2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) 
(2) (2) (2) (2) (2) 
(2) (2) (2) 3.2 3.8 
5.2 5.3 5.0 5.2 5.3 
6.2 9.3 (3)11.3 (3)14.5 (3)15.0 
1.7 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.6 
1.2 1.6 2. 1 2.2 1.9 
1.5 2.6 2.7 2.5 2.0 
1.6 1.6 1.8 2.2 2. 1 
2.0 2.5 3. 1 3.5 3. 1 
CONTINUED ON THE FOLLOWING PAGE. 
SUPPLEMENT TO TABLE 3. LABOR FORCE, EMPLOYMENT, AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN TEN COUNTRIES, 1959-84—CONTINUED 
FOOTNOTES: 
(1) PUBLISHED AND ADJUSTED DATA ARE IDENTICAL. 
(2) NOT AVAILABLE. 
(3) PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES BASED 01! INCOMPLETE DATA. 
(4) PUBLISHED AND ADJUSTED DATA ARE IDENTICAL FROM 1966 ONWARD. FOR 1959-1965, DATA ARE BLS ESTIMATES BASED ON HEW SURVEY DEFINITIONS. 
(5) INCLUDING MILITARY PERSONNEL FOR THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN, GERMANY, ITALY, AND SWEDEN. 
(6) THE SWEDISH LABOR FORCE SURVEY WAS INITIATED IN 1961. . THE PUBLISHED DATA FOR 1959-1960 ARE 
ESTIMATES MADE BY THE ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT. m «9Ro-TäS.UNITED STATES, CANADA, AUSTRALIA, JAPAN, ITALY, AND SWEDEN, UNEMPLOYMENT AS RECORDED 
5LSA-MP>E L A B 0 R F 0 R C E SURVEYS; FOR FRANCE, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF UNEMPLOYMENT; AND FOR GERMANY, 
GREAT BRITAIN, AND THE NETHERLANDS, THE REGISTERED UNEMPLOYED. C 8 ) Ιί?ττΑΪ5Ι5Α!:ΙΑΝ L A B 0 R F 0 R C E SURVEY WAS INITIATED IN 1964. UNEMPLOYMENT RATES FOR 1959-1963 ARE ESTIMATES MADE BY AN AUSTRALIAN RESEARCHER. 
( 9 ) n?,?-r^Nê5Aí-^USTRALIA' A N D FRANCE. UNEMPLOYMENT AS A PERCENT OF THE CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE; FOR THE 
rollio MÎAîf^vJ^^AM?.IALY^nnN5 SWEDEN, UNEMPLOYMENT AS A PERCENT OF THE CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE PLUS ípvrFL M?¿ IIn R 1 Y T P E^ S 0 N N E L ; F 0 R G E R M A N Y' GREAT BRITAIN, AND THE NETHERLANDS, REGISTERED UNEMPLOYED (EXCLUDING ADULT STUDENTS IN GREAT BRITAIN) AS A PERCENT OF EMPLOYED WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS PLUS THE UNEMPLOYED. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF FRANCE WHICH DOES NOT PUBLISH AN THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, THESE ARE THE USUALLY PUBLISHED UNEMPLOYMENT RATES FOR EACH COUNTRY. PUBLISHED RATES SHOWN FOR GERMANY GREAT BRITAIN, AND THE NETHERLANDS CANNOT BE COMPUTED FROM DATA CONTAINED IN THIS TABLE G E R M A N Y' 
NOTE: DATA FOR THE UNITED STATES RELATE TO THE POPULATION 16 YEARS OF AGE AND OVER PUBLISHFn DATA FOR FRANCE, GERMANY, AND ITALY RELATE TO THE POPULATION 14 YEARS OF AGE AND OVER;' FOR SWEDEN TO THE POPULATION AGED 16 TO 74; AND FOR CANADA, AUSTRALIA, JAPAN, GREAT BRITAIN, AND THE NETHER-LANDS, TO THE POPULATION 15 YEARS OF AGE AND OVER. BEGINNING IN 973, PUBLISHED DATA FOR GREAT ?5£Sê;S ?ELAJEcí2, Ï H E P 0 P U L A " ° N 16 YEARS OF AGE AND OVER. THE ADJUSTED STATIS?ICS HAVE BEEN ADAPTED, INSOFAR AS POSSIBLE, TO THE AGE AT WHICH COMPULSORY SCHOOLING ENDS IN EACH COUNTRY THEREFORE ADJUSTED STATISTICS FOR FRANCE RELATE TO THE POPULATION 16 YEARS OF AGE AND OVER. FOR GERMANY TO THE ^^LêïÎ0No-îf Y E A R S ° F A G E A N D 0 V E R' A N D F 0 R T H E NETHERLANDS, TO THE POPULATION 4 YEARS OF AGE AND 
E ! D Ï 8 S T Î ^ ^ ^ 
HASETIE°EN Ï Ï J V S Ï B ^ ^ AT ™EVALC ïff Ϊ8ι?χϊ? ,6Hf Î S 
SUPPLEMENT ΤΟ TABLE 8Α. CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT BY ECONOMIC SECTOR, 1960-84 (IN THOUSANDS) 
YEAR 
1960 
1965 1970 1971 1972 1973(3) 1974 
1975 
1976 1977 1978 1979 
1980 
1981 1982 1983 1984 
1960 
1965 1970 
197 1 
1972 
1973(3) 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
198 1 
1982 1983 1984 
UNITED 
STATES 
65,778 
71,088 78,678 79,367 82,153 85,064 86,794 
85,846 
88,752 92,017 96,048 98,824 
99,303 
100,397 99,526 100,834 105,005 
5,572 
4,477 3,567 3,510 3,598 3,572 3,613 
3,505 
3,453 3,426 3,550 3,508 
3,529 
3,519 3,570 3,541 3,469 
CANADA 
5,965 
6,862 7,919 8, 104 8,344 8,761 9, 125 
9,284 
9,477 9,651 9,987 10,395 
10,708 
11,006 10,644 10,734 11,000 
795 
694 604 607 575 573 579 
564 
56 1 
553 574 590 
583 
598 558 587 586 
AUS­
TRALIA 
NA 
4,614 
5,388 »» 
5,518 
5,602 
5,765 
5,891 
5,867 
5,946 
6,000 
5,997 
6,075 
6,250 
6,380 6,385 6,292 6,490 
NA 
448 432 424 440 422 408 
405 
390 398 379 398 
408 
416 412 416 404 
JAPAN 
43,370 
46,200 50, 140 50,470 50,580 51,900 51,710 
51,530 
52,020 52.720 53,360 54,040 
54,600 
55,060 55,620 56,550 56,870 
12,800 
10,500 8,490 7,840 7,310 6,810 6,540 
6,380 
6,210 6, 110 6, 100 5,860 
5,510 
5,330 5,250 5,060 NA 
FRANCE 
CIVILIAN 
18,595 19,540 20,343 20,438 20,552 20,814 20,959 
20,714 20,856 21,036 21, 113 21, 118 
21,127 20,959 20,984 20,839 NA 
GERMANY 
EMPLOYMENT 
25,954 26,418 26, 169 26,317 
26,214 26,411 26,038 
25,285 
25,059 25,014 25,169 25,507 
25,771 25,569 25,100 24,690 24,649 
AGRICULTURE (4) 
4,305 3,576 2,821 2,668 2,514 2,364 2,221 
2, 104 2,037 1,977 1,927 1,887 
1,841 1,794 1,738 1,692 NA 
3,623 2,876 2,262 2, 134 2,018 1,924 1,842 
1.773 1,682 1,589 1,536 1,479 
1,436 1,405 1,381 1,372 1,370 
GREAT BRITAIN (1) 
23, 24, 24, 24 24, 24 
24 
24 24 24 24 24 
24 23 
22 
,660 ,782 ,381 ,031 ,020 ,611 
,714 
,647 ,452 ,499 ,625 
,775 
,364 ,048 ,376 NA NA 
980 954 782 736 710 
713 681 
669 670 669 666 
654 
657 647 641 NA NA 
ITALY 
20,064 19,210 19,083 19,016 18,730 
18,914 19,346 
19,476 19,605 
19,794 19,867 20,097 
20,378 20,456 
20,397 NA NA 
6,514 5,031 3,839 3,817 3,550 3,438 3,373 
3,244 3,217 3, 119 3,053 2,985 
2,896 2,731 2,525 NA NA 
NETHER­LANDS 1 
4 4, 4 4 4 
4, 4, 
4 4, 4 4 
4, 
4 4 
[2) 
,092 ,414 ,601 
,622 ,597 ,594 ,596 
,564 ,563 ,573 ,609 
,667 
,689 ,628 NA NA NA 
465 388 329 319 315 309 304 
299 295 289 285 280 
279 274 NA NA NA 
SWEDEN 
3,513 3,673 3,836 3,842 3,845 3,861 
3,944 
4,044 4,070 4,081 4,097 
4, 162 
4,214 4,207 4,201 
4,206 4,249 
544 421 314 300 287 276 264 
26 1 254 248 250 242 
237 237 236 230 218 
CONTINUED ON THE FOLLOHING PAGE. 
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SUPPLEMENT TO TABLE 8. CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT BY ECONOMIC SECTOR, 1960-84—CONTINUED (IN THOUSANDS) 
YEAR 
UNITED 
STATES AUS-CANADA TRALIA JAPAN FRANCE GERMANY GREAT BRITAIN (1) ITALY 
NETHER-
LANDS 
(2) SNEDEN 
INDUSTRY (5) 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1 9 7 3 ( 3 ) 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1 9 7 3 ( 3 ) 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
2 1 , 9 9 5 
2 4 , 3 1 1 
2 6 , 0 8 0 
2 5 , 182 
2 5 , 8 2 8 
2 7 , 2 5 8 
2 7 , 2 1 3 
2 5 , 3 0 2 
2 6 , 3 1 0 
2 7 , 3 4 3 
2 8 , 8 10 
2 9 , 7 9 7 
2 9 , 136 
2 8 , 9 9 5 
2 7 , 0 7 0 
2 7 , 0 1 6 
2 8 , 6 1 7 
17 , 149 
19, 190 
2 0 , 7 4 6 
1 9 , 6 0 6 
1 9 , 9 4 3 
2 1 , 0 5 4 
2 1 , 0 2 5 
1 9 , 4 5 7 
2 0 , 2 6 1 
2 0 , 8 8 9 
2 1 , 7 8 4 
2 2 , 4 5 9 
2 1 , 9 4 2 
2 1 , 8 1 7 
2 0 , 2 8 6 
1 9 , 9 4 6 
2 0 , 9 9 5 
1 ,906 
2 , 2 3 3 
2 , 3 6 0 
2 , 3 8 3 
2 , 4 3 9 
2 , 5 8 6 
2 , 6 8 8 
2 , 6 1 3 
2 , 7 0 1 
2 , 6 7 5 
2 , 7 5 0 
2 , 8 8 4 
2 , 9 3 1 
2 , 9 8 3 
2 . 7 0 2 
2 , 6 2 2 
2 , 7 2 2 
1,47 1 
1 ,636 
1 ,768 
1 ,766 
1 ,823 
1 ,927 
1 ,978 
1 ,871 
1 ,921 
1 ,888 
1 ,956 
2 , 0 7 1 
2 , 111 
2 , 122 
1 ,930 
1 ,886 
1 ,968 
NA 
1 ,653 
1 ,886 »« 
1,916 
1 ,898 
1 ,945 
1 ,963 
1 ,870 
1 ,866 
1 .845 
1 ,767 
1 ,779 
1 ,809 
1 ,826 
1 ,772 
1 ,654 
1 ,675 
NA 
1 ,207 
1 ,340 
1 ,358 
1 ,344 
1 ,374 
1 ,380 
1 ,275 
1 ,289 
1 ,281 
1 , 199 
1 ,215 
1 ,242 
1 ,251 
1 ,213 
1 , 147 
1 ,148 
1 2 , 3 8 0 
1 5 , 0 1 0 
1 7 , 8 8 0 
18 , 140 
1 8 , 2 9 0 
1 9 , 2 1 0 
1 9 , 0 2 0 
1 8 , 3 7 0 
1 8 , 5 2 0 
1 8 , 5 1 0 
1 8 , 5 5 0 
1 8 , 7 4 0 
19 , 180 
1 9 , 3 0 0 
1 9 , 2 1 0 
1 9 , 4 7 0 
NA 
9 , 4 3 0 
1 1 , 4 5 0 
1 3 , 7 5 0 
1 3 , 8 2 0 
1 3 , 8 1 0 
1 4 , 4 2 0 
1 4 , 2 5 0 
1 3 , 4 3 0 
1 3 , 4 4 0 
1 3 , 3 5 0 
1 3 , 2 2 0 
1 3 , 2 9 0 
1 3 , 6 3 0 
1 3 , 8 0 0 
1 3 , 7 4 0 
1 4 , 0 1 0 
NA 
6 , 9 7 6 
7 , 6 3 7 
7 , 9 1 7 
7 , 9 4 8 
7 , 9 7 8 
8 , 0 9 7 
8 , 1 2 3 
7 , 8 5 3 
7 , 7 7 5 
7 , 7 3 9 
7 , 6 1 1 
7 , 4 8 9 
7 , 4 1 2 
7 , 2 0 3 
X 7 , 0 5 7 
» 6 , 8 5 0 
NA 
1 1 , 9 1 2 
1 2 , 5 0 1 
1 2 , 4 6 5 
1 2 , 5 3 0 
1 2 , 3 1 5 
1 2 , 3 4 8 
1 1 , 9 4 1 
1 1 , 2 4 3 
1 1 , 0 4 2 
1 0 , 9 4 4 
1 0 , 9 5 8 
1 1 , 0 8 6 
1 1 , 1 4 6 
1 0 , 8 8 7 
X 1 0 , 4 7 3 
X 1 0 , 110 
X 1 0 , 0 0 6 
MANUFACTURING 
5 , 2 5 0 
5 , 5 3 2 
5 , 6 6 1 
5 , 7 2 6 
5 , 7 7 8 
5 , 8 9 2 
5 , 9 4 2 
5 , 7 8 0 
5 , 7 2 1 
5 , 6 9 7 
5 , 6 1 2 
5 , 5 1 5 
5 , 4 4 5 
5 , 2 6 9 
NA 
NA 
NA 
8 , 9 0 7 
9 , 4 8 3 
9 , 7 7 9 
9 , 8 3 5 
9 , 6 5 2 
9 , 6 9 7 
9 , 4 7 9 
9 , 0 1 0 
8 , 8 0 7 
8 , 7 7 0 
8 , 7 5 1 
8 , 8 1 0 
8 , 8 4 9 
8 , 5 9 7 
X 8 . 3 1 3 
NA 
NA 
1 1 , 1 8 4 
1 1 , 1 1 7 
1 0 , 5 3 1 
1 0 , 1 7 1 
9 , 9 6 2 
10 , 142 
1 0 , 1 1 2 
9 , 6 7 2 
9 . 3 9 4 
9 , 3 7 7 
9 , 3 7 2 
9 , 3 4 4 
8 , 9 4 8 
X 8 , 0 2 8 
X 7 . 5 6 7 
NA 
NA 
8 , 8 7 4 
8 , 6 6 6 
8 , 4 6 5 
8 , 181 
7 , 9 0 8 
7 , 9 5 4 
7 , 9 9 5 
7 , 6 1 6 
7 , 3 7 3 
7 , 4 2 0 
7 , 3 8 2 
7 , 2 9 7 
6 , 9 2 9 
X 6 , 160 
X 5 . 8 1 9 
NA 
NA 
6 , 8 5 5 
7 , 174 
7 , 5 8 6 
7 , 6 1 3 
7 , 4 7 2 
7 , 4 6 6 
7 , 6 3 4 
7 , 6 6 3 
7 , 5 6 1 
7 , 6 6 2 
7 , 6 2 6 
7 , 6 4 1 
7 , 7 6 7 
7 , 7 2 2 
7 , 5 9 4 
NA 
NA 
4 , 8 1 3 
4 , 8 9 4 
5 , 2 9 3 
5 , 3 2 9 
5 , 2 2 3 
5 , 2 7 0 
5 , 4 3 8 
5 , 4 4 7 
5 , 4 3 5 
5 , 4 7 3 
5 , 4 2 0 
5 , 4 0 9 
5 , 4 8 5 
5 , 3 8 4 
5 , 2 7 7 
NA 
NA 
1 ,617 
1 ,769 
1 ,750 
1 ,730 
1 ,657 
1 ,635 
1 ,606 
1 .549 
1 ,507 
1 ,479 
1 ,466 
1 , 4 7 0 
1 , 4 4 9 
1 ,377 
NA 
NA 
NA 
1 , 193 
1 , 2 7 0 
1 , 2 4 1 
1 , 2 3 1 
1 , 181 
1 , 162 
1 ,159 
1 , 118 
1 , 0 7 2 
1 ,043 
1 ,018 
1 ,008 
997 
966 
NA 
NA 
NA 
1 , 4 2 0 
1 , 5 5 3 
1 ,456 
1 ,424 
1 ,396 
1 , 4 0 1 
1 ,434 
1 ,449 
1 ,416 
1 ,375 
1 ,328 
1 ,326 
1 ,327 
1 ,286 
1 ,237 
1 , 2 2 3 
1 ,228 
1 , 120 
1 ,206 
1 ,064 
1 ,054 
1 ,046 
1 ,066 
1 , 120 
1 , 138 
1 , 100 
1 ,060 
1 , 023 
1 ,026 
1 ,025 
984 
946 
941 
953 
CONTINUED ON THE FOLLOWING PAGE. 
SUPPLEMENT TO TABLE 8A. CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT BY ECONOMIC SECTOR, 
(IN THOUSANDS) 
1960-84—CONTINUED 
YEAR 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1 9 7 3 ( 3 ) 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
UNITED 
STATES 
3 8 , 2 1 2 
4 2 , 3 0 1 
4 9 , 0 3 1 
5 0 , 6 7 5 
5 2 , 7 2 7 
5 4 , 2 3 4 
5 5 , 9 6 8 
5 7 , 0 3 9 
5 8 , 9 8 9 
6 1 , 2 4 8 
6 3 , 6 8 8 
6 5 , 5 1 9 
6 6 , 6 3 8 
6 7 , 8 8 3 
6 8 , 8 8 6 
7 0 , 2 7 7 
7 2 , 9 1 9 
CANADA 
3 , 2 6 4 
3 , 9 3 4 
4 , 9 5 5 
5 , 114 
5 , 3 3 0 
5 , 6 0 2 
5 , 8 5 8 
6 , 108 
6 , 2 1 5 
6 , 4 2 4 
. 6 , 6 6 1 
6 , 9 2 0 
7 , 1 9 4 
7 , 4 2 5 
7 , 3 8 5 
7 , 5 2 5 
7 , 6 9 2 
AUS-
TRALIA 
NA 
2 , 5 1 4 
3 , 0 7 0 
3 , 178 
3 , 2 6 5 
3 , 3 9 9 
3 , 5 2 0 
3 , 5 9 2 
3 , 6 9 0 
3 , 7 5 7 
3 , 8 5 1 
3 , 8 9 8 
4 , 0 3 2 
4 , 137 
4 , 2 0 1 
4 , 2 2 2 
4 , 4 1 1 
JAPAN 
1 8 , 1 9 0 
2 0 , 6 9 0 
2 3 , 7 7 0 
2 4 , 5 1 0 
2 4 , 9 8 0 
2 5 , 8 8 0 
2 6 , 1 4 0 
2 6 , 7 7 0 
2 7 , 2 9 0 
2 8 , 100 
2 8 , 7 2 0 
2 9 , 4 4 0 
2 9 , 9 1 0 
3 0 , 4 3 0 
3 1 , 160 
3 2 , 0 2 0 
NA 
FRANCE GERMANY 
SERVICES ( 6 ) 
7 , 3 1 4 
8 , 3 2 7 
9 , 6 0 5 
9 , 8 2 2 
1 0 , 0 6 0 
1 0 , 3 5 3 
1 0 , 6 1 5 
1 0 , 7 5 7 
1 1 , 0 4 4 
1 1 , 3 2 0 
1 1 , 5 7 5 
1 1 , 7 4 2 
1 1 , 8 7 4 
1 1 , 9 6 2 
» 1 2 , 189 
« 1 2 , 2 9 7 
NA 
1 0 , 4 1 9 
1 1 , 0 4 1 
1 1 , 4 4 2 
1 1 , 6 5 3 
1 1 , 8 8 1 
1 2 , 1 3 9 
1 2 , 2 5 5 
1 2 , 2 6 9 
1 2 , 3 3 5 
1 2 , 4 8 1 
1 2 , 6 7 5 
1 2 , 9 4 2 
1 3 , 1 8 9 
1 3 , 2 7 7 
X 1 3 , 2 4 6 
X 1 3 , 2 0 8 
X 1 3 , 2 7 3 
GREAT 
BRITAIN 
( 1 ) 
1 1 , 4 9 6 
1 2 , 7 1 1 
1 3 , 0 7 1 
1 3 , 1 2 4 
1 3 , 3 4 8 
1 3 , 7 5 5 
1 3 , 9 2 1 
1 4 , 3 0 6 
1 4 , 3 8 8 
1 4 , 4 5 3 
1 4 , 5 8 7 
1 4 , 7 7 8 
1 4 , 7 6 0 
X 1 4 . 3 7 3 
X 1 4 , 1 6 8 
NA 
NA 
ITALY 
6 , 6 9 6 
7 , 0 0 5 
7 , 6 5 6 
7 , 5 8 4 
7 , 7 0 9 
8 , 0 0 9 
8 , 3 3 9 
8 , 5 6 8 
8 , 8 2 8 
9 , 0 1 2 
9 , 1 8 7 
9 , 4 7 1 
9 , 7 1 5 
1 0 , 0 0 3 
1 0 , 2 7 7 
NA 
NA 
NETHER-
LANDS 
( 2 ) 
2 , 0 1 0 
2 , 2 5 5 
2 , 5 2 2 
2 , 5 7 3 
2 , 6 2 5 
2 , 6 5 0 
2 , 6 8 6 
2 , 7 1 6 
2 , 7 6 1 
2 , 8 0 3 
2 , 8 5 8 
2 , 9 1 7 
2 , 9 6 1 
2 , 9 7 7 
NA 
NA 
NA 
SWEDEN 
1 ,550 
1 ,699 
2 , 0 6 6 
2 , 118 
2 , 162 
2 , 185 
2 , 2 4 6 
2 , 3 3 4 
2 , 4 0 0 
2 , 4 5 8 
2 , 5 1 9 
2 , 5 9 4 
2 , 6 5 0 
2 , 6 8 4 
2 , 7 2 8 
2 , 7 5 3 
2 , 7 9 2 
NA = NOT AVAILABLE. X = PRELIMINARY. 
(1) INCLUDING NORTHERN IRELAND. (2) MEASURED IN MAN-YEARS. 
(3) FROM 1973 ONWARDS, JAPAN INCLUDES OKINAWA. 
(4) AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY, HUNTING, AND FISHING. (5) MANUFACTURING, MINING, AND CONSTRUCTION. 
(6) TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATION, PUBLIC UTILITIES, TRADE, FINANCE, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, PRIVATE HOUSEHOLD SERVICES, AND MISCELLANEOUS SERVICES. 
NOTE: DATA HAVE NOT BEEN FULLY ADJUSTED FOR COMPARABILITY WITH U.S. DEFINITIONS. ALSO, SOME EMPLOYMENT COULD NOT BE DISTRIBUTED BY ECONOMIC SECTOR. BECAUSE OF ROUNDING, SUBTOTALS MAY NOT ADD TO TOTALS. 
SUPPLEMENT TO TABLE 8B. PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYMENT BY ECONOMIC SECTOR, 1960-84 
YEAR UNITED AUS- GREAT NETHER-STATES CANADA TRALIA JAPAN FRANCE GERMANY BRITAIN ITALY LANDS 
(1) (2) 
SWEDEN 
EACH YEAR 
1960 
1965 1970 
1971 
1972 1973(4) 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 1983 
1984 
1960 
1965 
1970 1971 
1972 
1973(4) 
1974 
100.0 100.0 
4.2 
4. 1 3.9 3.7 3.7 3.6 
3.6 3.5 3.6 3.5 3.3 
33 
34 
33 31 31. 
32. 31. 
13. 
10. 
7. 
7. 
6. 
6. 
6. 
6. 
5. 
5. 
5. 
5. 
5. 
5. 
5. 
5.5 
5.3 
32.0 
32.5 
29.8 
29 
29 
29. 
29. 
100.0 
NA 9.7 8.0 7.7 7.8 7.3 6.9 
6.9 6.6 6.6 6.3 6.6 
6.5 6.5 6.4 6.6 6.2 
NA 35.8 35.0 
34.7 
33.9 33.7 33.3 
CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT 
*' 100.0 100.0 100.0 
AGRICULTURE (3) 
100.0 
29.5 
22.7 16.9 15.5 14.4 13.1 12.6 
12.4 
11.9 11.6 11.4 10.8 
10.1 
9.7 9.4 8.9 NA 
28.5 
32.5 
35.7 
35.9 
36.2 
37.0 
36.8 
23.2 18.3 13.9 13.1 12.2 
11.4 10.6 
10.2 9.8 9.4 9.1 8.9 
8.7 8.6 8.3 8.1 NA 
INDUSTRY 
37.5 39.1 38.9 
38.9 38.8 38.9 38.8 
14.0 10.9 8.6 8.1 7.7 7.3 7.1 
7.0 6.7 6.4 6.1 5.8 
5.6 5.5 5.5 5.6 5.6 
(5) 
45.9 47.3 47.6 47.6 47.0 46.8 45.9 
4. 1 3.8 3.2 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.8 
2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.6 
2.7 2.8 2.9 NA NA 
47.3 
44.9 
43.2 
42.3 41.5 41.2 40.9 
100.0 
32.5 26.2 20.1 20.1 19.0 18.2 17.4 
16.7 16.4 15.8 15.4 14.9 
14.2 13.4 12.4 
NA 
NA 
34.2 37.4 39.8 40.0 39.9 39.5 39.5 
100.0 
11.4 8.8 7.2 6.9 6.8 6.7 6.6 
6.6 6.5 6.3 
6 6. 
6. 
5. NA NA NA 
39.5 40. 1 38.0 
37.4 
36.0 
35.6 
34.9 
100.0 
15.5 11.5 8.2 7.8 7.5 7.1 6.7 
5.6 
5.5 
5.2 
40.4 
42.3 
38.0 
37 
36. 
36. 
36. 
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SUPPLEMENT TO TABLE 8B. PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYMENT BY ECONOMIC SECTOR, 1960-84—CONTINUED 
YEAR 
1975 
1976 1977 1978 1979 
1980 
1981 1982 1983 1984 
1960 
1965 1970 197 1 1972 1973(4) 1974 
1975 
1976 1977 1978 1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 1983 1984 
UNITED 
STATES 
29.5 
29.6 29.7 30.0 30.2 
29.3 
28.9 27.2 26.8 27.2 
26. 1 
27.0 26.4 24.7 24.3 24.8 24.2 
22.7 
22.8 22.7 22.7 22.7 
22. 1 
21.7 
20.4 19.8 20.0 
CANADA 
28. 1 
28.5 27.7 27.5 27.7 
27.4 
27. 1 25.4 24.4 24.8 
24.7 
23.8 22.3 21.8 21.8 22.0 21.7 
20.2 
20.3 19.6 19.6 19.9 
19.7 
19.3 
18. 1 17.6 17.9 
AUS-
TRALIA 
3 1 · 9 '., 31.4 ' 30.8 29.5 29.3 
28.9 
28.6 27.8 26.3 25.8 
NA 
26.2 24.9 24.6 24.0 23.8 23.4 
21.7 
21.7 21.4 20.0 20.0 
19.9 
19.6 
19.0 18.2 17.7 
JAPAN 
35.6 ' 35.6 35. 1 34.8 
34.7 
35. 1 
35.0 34.5 34.4 
NA 
21.7 24.8 
27.4 27.4 27.3 27.8 27.6 
26. 1 25.8 25.3 24.8 24.6 
25.0 25. 1 
24.7 24.8 
NA 
FRANCE 
INDUSTRY 
37.9 37.3 36.8 36.0 
35.5 
35.1 34.4 X33.6 X32.9 
NA 
GERMANY 
(5) 
44.4 44.1 43.8 43.5 43.5 
43.2 42.6 X41.7 X41.0 
X40.6 
MANUFACTURING 
28.2 28.3 27.8 28.0 28. 1 28.3 28.4 
27.9 27.4 27.1 26.6 26.1 
25.8 25. 1 
NA NA NA 
34.3 35.9 37.4 37.4 36.8 36.7 36.4 
35.6 35.2 35.1 34.8 34.5 
34.3 33.6 X33. 1 
NA NA 
GREAT BRITAIN (1) 
39.2 
38.4 38.3 38. 1 
37.7 
36.7 X34.8 X33.8 
NA NA 
37.5 35.0 34.7 34.0 32.9 32.3 32.4 
30.9 30.2 
30.3 30.0 
29.4 
28.4 X26.7 X26.0 NA NA 
ITALY 
39.4 38.6 
38.7 38.4 38.0 
38.1 
37.8 37.2 NA NA 
24.0 25.5 27.7 28.0 27.9 27.9 28.1 
28.0 
27.7 27.6 27.3 26.9 
26.9 26.3 25.9 NA NA 
NETHER-LANDS (2) 
33.9 33.0 32.3 31.8 
31.5 
30.9 29.8 NA NA NA 
29.2 28.8 27.0 26.6 25.7 25.3 
25.2 
24.5 23.5 22.8 22. 1 21.6 
21.3 
20.9 NA NA NA 
SWEDEN 
35.8 34.8 33.7 32.4 31.9 
31.5 30.6 
29.4 29. 1 29.0 
31.9 32.8 27.7 27.4 27.2 27.6 28.4 
28. 1 27.0 26.0 25.0 24.6 
24.3 23.4 22.5 22.4 
20.5 
CONTINUED ON THE FOLLOWING PAGE. 
SUPPLEMENT TO TABLE 8B. PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYMENT BY ECONOMIC SECTOR, 1960-84—CONTINUED 
YEAR UNITED STATES CANADA 
AUS-TRALIA JAPAN GREAT NETHER-FRANCE GERMANY BRITAIN ITALY LANDS SWEDEN (1) (2) 
SERVICES (6) 
1960 1965 1970 1971 1972 1973(4) 1974 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
58.1 59.5 62.3 63.8 64.2 63.8 64.5 
66. 66, 66. 66. 66. 
67.1 67.6 69.2 69.7 69.4 
54. 57. 62. 63. 63 63. 64 
65.8 65.6 66.6 66.7 66.6 
67. 67. 69. 70. 69. 
NA 54.5 57.0 57.6 58.3 59.0 59.8 
61.2 62.0 62. 64. 64. 
.6 .2 .2 
64.5 64.8 65.8 67.1 68.0 
41.9 44.8 47.4 48.6 49.4 49.9 50.6 
52.0 52.5 53.3 53.8 54.5 
54.8 55.3 56.0 56.6 NA 
39.3 42.6 47.2 48.1 48.9 49.7 50.6 
51.9 53.0 53.8 54.8 55.6 
56.2 57.1 X58. 1 X59.0 NA 
40.1 41.8 43.7 44.3 45.3 46.0 47.1 
48.5 49.2 49.9 50.4 50.7 
51.2 51.9 X52.8 X53.5 X53.8 
48.6 51.3 53.6 54.6 55.6 55.9 56.3 
58.0 58.8 59.0 59.2 59.6 
60.6 X62.4 X63.3 NA NA 
33.4 36.5 40.1 39.9 41.2 42.3 43.1 
44.0 45.0 45.5 46.2 47.1 
47.7 48.9 50.4 
NA 
NA 
49.1 51.1 54.8 55.7 57.1 57.7 58.4 
59. 60. 61. 62. 62. 
63.1 64.3 NA NA NA 
44 46 53 55, 56 56. 56. 
57.7 59.0 60.2 61.5 62.3 
62.9 63.8 64.9 65.4 65.9 
NA = NOT AVAILABLE, x = PRELIMINARY. (1) INCLUDING NORTHERN IRELAND. (2) MEASURED IN MAN-YEARS. (3) AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY, HUNTING, AND FISHING. (4) FROM 1973 ONWARDS, JAPAN INCLUDES OKINAWA. (5) MANUFACTURING, MINING, AND CONSTRUCTION. (6) TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATION, PUBLIC UTILITIES, TRADE, FINANCE, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, PRIVATE HOUSEHOLD SERVICES, AND MISCELLANEOUS SERVICES. NOTE: DATA HAVE NOT BEEN FULLY ADJUSTED FOR COMPARABILITY WITH U.S. DEFINITIONS. ALSO, SOME EMPLOYMENT COULD NOT BE DISTRIBUTED BY ECONOMIC SECTOR. BECAUSE OF ROUNDING, SUBTOTALS MAY NOT ADD TO TOTALS. 
SUPPLEMENT TO TABLE 10. UNEMPLOYMENT RATES (CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE BASIS) BY AGE, 1980-84 
AGE GROUP 
ALL WORKING AGES TEENAGERS (3) 20-24 YEARS 25 YEARS AND OVER 
ALL WORKING AGES TEENAGERS (3) 20-24 YEARS 25 YEARS AND OVER 
ALL WORKING AGES TEENAGERS (3) 20-24 YEARS 25 YEARS AND OVER 
ALL WORKING AGES TEENAGERS (3) 20-24 YEARS 25 YEARS AND OVER 
ALL WORKING AGES TEENAGERS (3) 20-24 YEARS 25 YEARS AND OVER 
UNITED STATES 
7.1 17.8 11.5 5.1 
7.6 19.6 12.3 5.4 
9.7 23.2 14.9 7.4 
9.6 22.4 14.5 7.5 
7.5 18.9 11.5 5.8 
CANADA 
7.5 16.2 11.0 5.4 
7.5 16.2 11.2 5.6 
11.0 21.9 16.8 8.4 
11.9 22.2 18.5 9.4 
11.3 20.0 16.8 9.3 
AUS-TRALIA 
M 6.1 
17.1 8.9 3.7 
5.8 15.6 8.2 3.7 
7.1 18.5 10.4 4.7 
9.9 23.6 14.6 6.9 
9.0 22.3 12.9 6.3 
JAPAN 
1980 
2.0 4.2 3.3 1.8 
1981 
2.2 5.6 3.7 2.0 
1982 
2.4 5.6 4.0 2. 1 
1983 
2.7 6.4 4.1 2.4 
1984 
2.8 6.9 4.6 2.5 
FRANCE (1) 
6.1 25.9 : 13.0 4.3 
7.0 29.1 15.1 5.0 
7.8 31.3 17.3 5.6 
8.0 30.7 18.8 5.8 
(4) (4) (4) (4) 
GER-MANY (1) 
2.7 3.5 3.5 2.4 
3.6 4.3 5.1 3.3 
5.3 6.9 8.0 4.8 
(4) (4) (4) (4) 
(4) (4) (4) (4) 
GREAT BRITAIN (2) 
6.6 15.7 10.3 4.9 
10.1 21.1 15.9 7.9 
11.8 24.1 18.0 9.3 
11.6 23.4 18.2 9.1 
11.6 22.8 18.8 9.1 
ITALY 
3.9 18.4 12.1 1.7 
4.3 20.9 13.0 1.9 
4.8 23.7 14.2 2.1 
5.3 26.6 15.6 2.5 
(4) (4) (4) (4) 
SWEDEN 
2.0 7.7 3.7 1.4 
2.5 9.6 4.9 1.8 
3.1 10.9 6.0 2.3 
3.5 10.6 7.0 2.6 
3. 1 5.0 6.7 2.6 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) (5) 
FORENS?RfíTA9âSEAESRl5A?C5ND9SS; m l ! AND ,983 AND APRIL-MAY 1982 AND G E R" AN DATA ARE FOR DATA NOT ADJUSTED TO U.S. CONCEPTS. FIGURES FOR 1983 ARE NOT COMPARABLE TO THE EARLIER FIGURES f^A"Ü,0ET*CHANGE IN THE SYSTEM OF COUNTING THE UNEMPLOYED FROM REGISTRATIONS TO CLAIMANTS THE 1983 FIGURES ARE SLIGHTLY UNDERSTATED FOR COMPARISON WITH EARLIER YEARS. 
T£"ï?»»?,:YEAR,;:2k?? IN T H E U N I T E D STATES, FRANCE, GREAT BRITAIN, AND SWEDEN; J5-T0 19-Y^AR-OLDS IN CANADA, AUSTRALIA, JAPAN, AND GERMANY; AND 14-TO 19-YEAR-OLDS IN ITALY. 
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE. 
SUPPLEMENT TO TABLE 12. LAEOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES (CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE BASIS) BY SEX, 1960-84 
YEAR 
BOTH 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
197 1 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
198 1 
1982 
1983 
1984 
UNITED 
STATES 
SEXES 
59.4 
59.3 
58.8 
58.7 
58.7 
58.9 
59.2 
59.6 
59.6 
60. 1 
60.4 
60.2 
60.4 
60.8 
61.2 
61.2 
61.6 
62.3 
63.2 
63.7 
63.8 
63.9 
64.0 
64.0 
64.4 
CANADA 
(1)56.2 
(1)56.2 
(1)56.0 
(1)55.9 
(1)56.2 
(1)56.5 
57.3 
57.6 
57.6 
57.9 
57.8 
58. 1 
58.6 
59.7 
60.5 
61.1 
6 1.1 
61 .6 
62.7 
63.4 
64. 1 
64.8 
64. 1 
64.4 
64.8 
AUSTRALIA 
• 
(2) 
(2) 
(2) 
(2) 
59.4 
59.9 
60.6 
61.2 61.2 61.4 
62.1 
62.2 
62.3 
62.6 
63.0 
63.2 
62.7 
62.7 
62.0 61.7 
62.2 
62.0 
61.8 
61.5 
(4)61.5 
JAPAN 
•i67.9 67.8 
66.9 
65.7 
64.8 
64.5 
64.6 
64.8 
64.9 
64.6 
64.5 
64.2 
63.8 
64.0 
63.0 
62.4 
62.4 62.5 
62.8 
62.7 
62.6 62.6 
62.7 
63. 1 
62.7 
FRANCE 
60.9 
60.2 
59. 1 
58.1 
58.3 
57.6 
57.8 
57.5 
57.6 58.1 
57.5 
57.3 
57.1 
57.2 
57.1 
56.7 
56.9 
57.0 57.1 
57.0 
56.7 
56.5 
56.7 
56.1 
(4)56.3 
GERMANY 
60.0 
59.9 
59.6 
59.4 
59.0 
58.7 
58.2 
57.0 
56.9 
57.0 
56.9 
56.6 
55.9 
55.8 55.1 
54.4 
53.8 
53.4 
53.3 
53.3 
53.2 
52.9 
52.5 
52.8 
(4)53.1 
GREAT 
BRITAIN 
62.3 
62.5 62.4 62.5 62.4 
62.5 62.5 62.1 
61.8 61.5 
61.2 60.9 61.3 62.9 62.7 
63.1 63.2 63.2 63.3 63.2 
63.2 
62.2 (4)61.9 (4)62.2 (4)62.7 
ITALY 
55.8 55.5 54.5 53.0 52.3 
51.2 49.8 50.0 49.5 49.1 
48.8 48.5 47.5 47.4 47.5 
47.5 47.8 48.0 47.7 47.8 
48.0 48.0 47.4 47.2 (4)47.5 
NETHER-LANDS 
(2) (2) (2) (2) (2) 
(2) (2) (2) (2) (2) 
(2) (2) (2) (3)49.8 (2) 
(3)49.7 (2) (3)49.4 (2) (3)49.8 
(2) (3)51.5 (2) (3)52.4 (2) 
SMEDEN 
66.7 66.8 66.4 65.3 64.5 
64. 1 64.2 63.3 63.8 63.8 
64.0 64.2 64.2 64. 1 64.9 
65.9 66.0 65.9 
66. 1 
66.6 
67.0 
66 .8 
66 .8 
(4)66 9 
(4)67.0 
CONTINUED ON THE FOLLOWING PAGE. 
SUPPLEMENT TO TABLE 12. LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES (CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE BASIS) BY SEX, 
1960-84—CONTINUED 
YEAR 
MALE 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
UNITED 
STATES 
83.3 
82.9 
82.0 
81.4 
81.0 
80.7 
80.4 
80.4 
80. 1 
79.8 
79.7 
79. 1 
79.0 
78.8 
78.7 
77.9 
77.5 
77.7 
77.9 77.8 
77.4 
77.0 
76.6 
76.4 
76.4 
CANADA 
( 1)82.8 
( 1)81.8 
( 1)81. 1 
(1)80.5 
( 1)80. 1 
(1)79.9 
79.8 
79.3 
78.6 
78.3 
77.8 
77.3 
77.5 
78.2 
78.7 
78.4 
77.6 
77.7 
78. 1 78.5 
78.4 
78.4 
77.0 
76.7 
76.6 
AUSTRALIA 
(2) 
(2) (2) (2) 85.3 
85. 1 
85.4 
84.9 
84.5 
84.2 
84. 1 
83.8 
83.6 
83.2 
82.7 
82.2 
81.5 
81.0 
79.8 79.5 
79.2 
78.9 
78.4 
77.7 
(4)77.3 
JAPAN 
·» 84.2 
84.3 
83.6 
82.5 
81.5 
81. 1 
81. 1 
81.0 
81.7 
81.5 
81.5 
81.9 
81.9 
81.9 
81.6 
81.2 81.0 
80.4 
80. 1 
79.9 
79.6 
79.6 
79.3 
79.2 
78.5 
FRANCE 
(5)85.1 (2) 
(5)84.6 
(5)84.3 
(5)83.2 
(5)82.4 
(5)82.1 
(5)80.6 
(5)79.0 
(5)78.3 
78.3 
78.0 
77.0 
76.5 
75.8 
74.4 
74.4 
74.0 
73.8 
73.0 
72.4 
71.8 
71.3 
69.5 (2) 
GERMANY 
82.7 
82.7 
82.2 
81.8 
81.4 
80.8 
80.5 
79.3 
79.0 
79.0 
78.7 
77.8 
76. 1 
75.3 
74. 1 
73.1 
72.1 
71.6 
71.3 
71. 1 
70.4 
69.6 
68.8 
68.8 (2) 
GREAT 
BRITAIN 
88. 1 
87.6 
86.9 
86.9 
86.0 
85.5 
85.0 
84.9 
83.9 
83.2 
82.3 
81.5 
81.4 
82.8 
81.3 
81.4 
81.3 
80.8 
80.3 
79.7 
79.5 
78.6 
(4)77.7 
(4)77.0 (2) 
ITALY 
82.0 
81.5 
80.4 
79.1 
78.5 
77.3 
75.7 
75.9 
74.9 
74.2 
73.5 
73.2 
71.8 
71.0 
70.8 
70.4 
70.2 
69.2 
68.5 
68.1 
67.7 
67.5 
66.6 
65.9 (2) 
NETHER-
LANDS 
(2) (2) (2) (2) (2) 
(2) (2) (2) (2) (2) 
(2) (2) (2) 
(3)73.9 (2) 
(3)73.1 (2) 
(3)71.8 (2) 
(3)70.4 
(2) 
(3)70.0 (2) 
(3)69.8 (2) 
SWEDEN 
(2) 
87. 1 
85.4 
83.7 
83.0 
82.2 
81.6 ' 
80.4 
80. 1 
79. 1 
78.5 
78.0 
77.3 
76.8 
76.7 
77.0 
76.5 
75.6 
75. 1 
75. 1 
74.9 
73.9 
73.5 
(4)73.1 
(4)72.7 
CONTINUED ON THE FOLLOWING PAGE. 
SUPPLEMENT TO TABLE 12. LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES (CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE BASIS) BY SEX, 
1960-84—CONTINUED 
YEAR 
UNITED 
STATES CANADA AUSTRALIA JAPAN GREAT NETHER-FRANCE GERMANY BRITAIN ITALY LANDS SWEDEN 
FEMALE 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
197 1 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
37 .7 
3 8 . 1 
37 .9 
3 8 . 3 
38 .7 
3 9 . 3 
4 0 . 3 
4 1 . 1 
41 .6 
42 .7 
4 3 . 3 
4 3 . 4 
4 3 . 9 
44 .7 
45 .7 
4 6 . 3 
4 7 . 3 
4 8 . 4 
5 0 . 0 
5 0 . 9 
5 1 . 5 
5 2 . 1 
52 .6 
5 2 . 9 
53 .6 
( 1 ) 3 0 . 1 
( 1 ) 3 1 . 0 
( 1 ) 3 1 . 3 
( 1 ) 3 1 . 9 
( 1 ) 3 2 . 9 
( 1 ) 3 3 . 8 
3 5 . 4 
3 6 . 5 
3 7 . 1 
3 8 . 0 
3 8 . 3 
3 9 . 4 
4 0 . 2 
4 1 . 9 
4 3 . 0 
4 4 . 4 
4 5 . 2 
4 6 . 0 
4 7 . 9 
4 9 . 0 
5 0 . 4 
51 .7 
51 .7 
52 .6 
5 3 . 5 
( 2 ) 
( 2 ) 
( 2 ) 
( 2 ) 
3 3 . 8 
34 .8 
3 6 . 3 
3 7 . 8 
3 8 . 3 
3 9 . 0 
4 0 . 4 
4 1 . 0 
4 1 . 2 
4 2 . 4 
4 3 . 5 
4 4 . 5 
4 4 . 3 
4 4 . 8 
4 4 . 5 
4 4 . 3 
4 5 . 5 
4 5 . 5 
4 5 . 4 
4 5 . 5 
( 4 ) 4 6 . 2 
5 2 . 7 
5 2 . 4 
5 1 . 3 
5 0 . 0 
4 9 . 3 
4 8 . 8 
4 9 . 2 
4 9 . 6 
4 9 . 2 
4 8 . 8 
4 9 . 3 
4 7 . 7 
4 6 . 8 
4 7 . 3 
4 5 . 7 
4 4 . 8 
4 4 . 8 
4 5 . 7 
4 6 . 4 
4 6 . 6 
4 6 . 6 
4 6 . 7 
4 7 . 0 
4 8 . 0 
4 7 . 8 
( 5 ) 4 0 . 5 
( 2 ) 
( 5 ) 4 0 . 2 
( 5 ) 3 8 . 4 
( 5 ) 3 9 . 0 
( 5 ) 3 8 . 2 
( 5 ) 3 8 . 9 
( 5 ) 3 8 . 4 
( 5 ) 3 8 . 7 
( 5 ) 3 8 . 8 
3 9 . 0 
3 8 . 8 
3 9 . 3 
3 9 . 8 
4 0 . 3 
4 0 . 8 
4 1 . 1 
4 1 . 8 
4 2 . 1 
4 2 . 6 
4 2 . 6 
4 2 . 8 
4 3 . 5 
4 4 . 0 
( 2 ) 
4 1 . 2 
4 1 . 0 
4 0 . 7 
4 0 . 7 
4 0 . 3 
4 0 . 0 
3 9 . 4 
3 8 . 4 
3 8 . 5 
3 8 . 5 
3 8 . 4 
3 8 . 5 
3 8 . 6 
3 8 . 9 
3 8 . 8 
3 8 . 4 
3 8 . 2 
3 7 . 8 
3 7 . 8 
3 7 . 9 
3 8 . 2 
3 8 . 3 
3 8 . 4 
3 8 . 8 
( 2 ) 
3 9 . 8 
4 0 . 3 
4 0 . 6 
4 0 . 9 
4 1 . 3 
4 1 . 8 
4 2 . 2 
4 2 . 1 
4 2 . 0 
4 2 . 1 
4 2 . 3 
4 2 . 4 
4 3 . 2 
4 5 . 0 
4 6 . t 
4 6 . 6 
4 6 . 9 
4 7 . 4 
4 8 . 0 
4 8 . 2 
4 8 . 3 
4 7 . 8 
( 4 ) 4 7 . 5 
( 4 ) 4 7 . 8 
( 2 ) 
3 2 . 2 
3 2 . 3 
3 1 . 4 
2 9 . 6 
2 8 . 6 
2 7 . 6 
2 6 . 3 
2 6 . 4 
2 6 . 3 
2 6 . 4 
2 6 . 2 
2 6 . 1 
2 5 . 4 
2 5 . 9 
2 6 . 3 
2 6 . 6 
2 7 . 5 
2 8 . 6 
2 8 . 6 
2 9 . 2 
2 9 . 9 
3 0 . 1 
3 0 . 0 
3 0 . 1 
( 2 ) 
( 2 ) 
( 2 ) 
( 2 ) 
( 2 ) 
( 2 ) 
( 2 ) 
( 2 ) 
( 2 ) 
( 2 ) 
( 2 ) 
( 2 ) 
( 2 ) 
( 2 ) 
( 3 ) 2 6 . 4 
( 2 ) 
( 3 ) 2 6 . 9 
( 2 ) 
( 3 ) 2 7 . 6 
( 2 ) 
( 3 ) 2 9 . 1 
( 2 ) 
( 3 ) 3 2 . 9 
( 2 ) 
( 3 ) 3 4 . 8 
( 2 ) 
( 2 ) 
4 6 . 1 
4 7 . 1 
4 7 . 5 
4 6 . 8 
4 6 . 6 
4 7 . 3 
4 6 . 8 
4 8 . 0 
4 8 . 8 
5 0 . 0 
5 0 . 9 
5 1 . 5 
5 1 . 7 
5 3 . 3 
5 5 . 2 
5 5 . 8 
5 6 . 7 
5 7 . 5 
5 8 . 5 
5 9 . 3 
6 0 . 1 
6 0 . 5 
( 4 ) 6 1 . 0 
( 4 ) 6 1 . 5 
CONTINUED ON THE FOLLOWING PAGE. 
SUPPLEMENT TO TABLE 12. LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES (CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE BASIS) BY SEX. 1960-84—CONTINUED 
(1) ESTIMATES BY BLS BASED ON NEW SURVEY DEFINITIONS. 1966 ONWARD ON THE NEW SURVEY BASIS. (2) NOT AVAILABLE. (3) DATA ARE FOR MARCH-MAY. .. (4) PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE. (5) BLS ESTIMATE. 
STATISTICS CANADA REVISED THE DATA FOR 
NOTE: DATA RELATE TO THE CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE APPROXIMATING U.S. CONCEPTS AS A PERCENT OF THE CIVILIAN NONINSTITUTIONALIZED WORKING AGE POPULATION. WORKING AGE IS DEFINED AS 16-YEAR-OLDS AND OVER IN THE UNITED STATES, FRANCE, AND SWEDEN; 15-YEAR-OLDS AND OVER IN AUSTRALIA, CANADA, GERMANY, AND JAPAN; AND 14-YEAR-OLDS AND OVER IN ITALY. FOR GREAT BRITAIN, THE LOWER AGE LIMIT WAS RAISED FROM 15 TO 16 IN 1973. FOR THE NETHERLANDS, THE LOWER AGE LIMIT WAS RAISED FROM 14 TO 15 IN 1975. THE INSTITUTIONALIZED WORKING AGE POPULATION IS INCLUDED IN JAPAN AND GERMANY. 
SUPPLEMENT TO TABLE U . EMPLOYMENT-POPULATION RATIOS (CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT BASIS) (1), 1960-84 
UNITED GREAT NETHER-
YEAR STATES CANADA AUSTRALIA JAPAN FRANCE GERMANY BRITAIN ITALY LANDS SWEDEN 
1960 
196 1 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
5 6 . 1 
55 .4 5 5 . 5 5 5 . 4 55 .7 
5 6 . 2 
5 6 . 9 5 7 . 3 5 7 . 5 5 8 . 0 
5 7 . 4 
5 6 . 6 5 7 . 0 · 5 7 . 8 57 .8 
5 6 . 1 
5 6 . 8 57 .9 5 9 . 3 5 9 . 9 
5 9 . 2 
5 9 . 0 . 57 .8 
57 .9 59 .5 
( 2 ) 5 2 . 6 
( 2 ) 5 2 . 4 ( 2 ) 5 2 . 9 ( 2 ) 5 3 . 1 ( 2 ) 5 3 . 8 
( 2 ) 5 4 . 5 
5 5 . 4 5 5 . 4 5 5 . 0 5 5 . 3 
5 4 . 5 
5 4 . 5 5 4 . 9 5 6 . 4 5 7 . 3 
5 6 . 9 
5 6 . 7 56 .6 5 7 . 5 5 8 . 7 
5 9 . 3 
5 9 . 9 5 7 . 0 
56 .7 5 7 . 4 
( 3 ) 
( 3 ) ( 3 ) ( 3 ) 5 8 . 6 
5 9 . 1 
5 9 . 6 6 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 6 0 . 2 
6 1 . 1 
6 1 . 1 6 0 . 6 6 1 . 2 6 1 . 3 
6 0 . 1 
5 9 . 7 5 9 . 2 5 8 . 1 5 7 . 9 
5 8 . 4 
5 8 . 4 5 7 . 3 
5 5 . 4 ( 4 ) 5 6 . 0 
. 6 6 . 7 
6 6 . 8 •166.0 6 4 . 8 6 4 . 1 
6 3 . 6 
6 3 . 7 6 4 . 0 6 4 . 1 6 3 . 9 
6 3 . 8 
6 3 . 4 6 2 . 9 6 3 . 2 6 2 . 2 
6 1 . 2 
6 1 . 1 6 1 . 2 6 1 . 3 6 1 . 4 
6 1 . 3 
6 1 . 2 6 1 . 2 
6 1 . 4 6 1 . 0 
5 9 . 9 5 9 . 4 5 8 . 3 5 7 . 4 5 7 . 5 
5 6 . 8 5 6 . 8 5 6 . 5 5 6 . 2 5 6 . 8 
5 6 . 1 
5 5 . 8 5 5 . 5 5 5 . 6 5 5 . 5 
5 4 . 3 5 4 . 3 5 4 . 3 5 4 . 1 5 3 . 6 
5 3 . 1 
5 2 . 3 5 1 . 9 
5 1 . 3 ( 4 ) 5 0 . 6 
5 9 . 4 5 9 . 6 5 9 . 3 5 9 . 2 5 8 . 8 
5 8 . 6 5 8 . 0 5 6 . 3 5 6 . 2 5 6 . 6 
5 6 . 6 5 6 . 2 5 5 . 5 5 5 . 4 5 4 . 2 
5 2 . 5 5 2 . 0 5 1 . 6 5 1 . 5 5 1 . 7 
5 1 . 6 5 0 . 7 4 9 . 4 
4 8 . 8 ( 4 ) 4 8 . 9 
6 1 . 0 6 1 . 3 6 0 . 8 6 0 . 6 6 0 . 9 
6 1 . 2 6 1 . 1 6 0 . 2 5 9 . 9 5 9 . 7 
5 9 . 4 5 8 . 6 5 8 . 7 6 0 . 9 6 0 . 8 
6 0 . 3 5 9 . 5 5 9 . 3 5 9 . 4 5 9 . 8 
5 8 . 9 5 5 . 8 ( 4 ) 5 4 . 6 ( 4 ) 5 4 . 2 ( 4 ) 5 4 . 6 
5 4 . 0 5 4 . 0 5 3 . 2 5 1 . 9 5 1 . 1 
4 9 . 6 4 8 . 1 4 8 . 5 4 7 . 9 4 7 . 6 
4 7 . 4 4 7 . 1 4 5 . 9 4 5 . 8 4 6 . 2 
4 6 . 1 4 6 . 1 4 6 . 3 
4 5 . 9 4 5 . 9 
4 6 . 1 4 5 . 9 4 5 . 2 4 4 . 7 ( 4 ) 4 4 . 8 
( 3 ) ( 3 ) 
( 3 ) ( 3 ) ( 3 ) 
( 3 ) ( 3 ) ( 3 ) ( 3 ) ( 3 ) 
( 3 ) ( 3 ) ( 3 ) 
4 6 . 4 4 6 . 4 
4 6 . 6 4 6 . 5 4 6 . 5 4 6 . 3 4 6 . 4 
4 6 . 9 4 6 . 5 ( 4 ) 4 5 . 4 ( 4 ) 4 4 . 8 ( 4 ) 4 4 . 5 
6 5 . 6 6 5 . 8 
6 5 . 4 6 4 . 2 6 3 . 5 
6 3 . 3 6 3 . 2 6 2 . 0 6 2 . 4 6 2 . 6 
6 3 . 1 6 2 . 6 6 2 . 4 6 2 . 5 6 3 . 6 
6 4 . 8 6 4 . 9 6 4 . 8 6 4 . 6 6 5 . 3 
6 5 . 6 6 5 . 1 6 4 . 7 ( 4 ) 6 4 . 6 ( 4 ) 6 4 . 9 
(1) CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT APPROXIMATING U.S. CONCEPTS AS A PERCENT OF THE CIVILIAN NONINSTTTUTTHNÄI 
S.°,KÏSG A £ E ΡΟρυ·­ΑΤΙΟΝ. THE DATA RELATE TO PERSONS 16 AND OVER IN THE UNITED STATES, FRANCE AND 
?lJ¡DF^,^5.^P 0 V E R I N CANADA, AUSTRALIA, JAPAN, AND GERMANY; AND 4 AND ¿VER IN ITALY 
IWl V2BE5FÎ2IOF;BÏÏ W A S *AÏSES F R ™ .i?.™ " I K « ? " F ° R ° R E AT BRITAIN AND FROM i4 TO is IN 1975 
(2) 
(3) (4 ) 
pc?TMA? C c E id E R H N £ S ; . .J H E INSTITUTIONALIZED WORKING AGE POPULATION' IS "lNCLubËD,'lN"jÀPAN"AND GERMANY 
196TIM2N^RSYONL?HÌASÌS S « ! ? S S Ï P D E F I N I T I 0 N S · STATISTICS CANADA REVISED Α Ϊ Α ^ Ο Γ ^ ^ 
NOT AVAILABLE. 
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE. 
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